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Once We Were Slaves, Now We Are Free:
Legal, Administrative,
and Social Issues Raised by
Passover Celebrations in Prison
Aviva Orenstein*
Abstract
“Once we were slaves, now we are free” is a central line from the
Jewish Passover Seder, a ritual meal in which participants retell the story of
liberation from Pharaoh’s oppression. In prison, many Jewish inmates
request access to a Seder and to kosher-for-Passover food for the eight-day
holiday. Prisoners’ requests to celebrate Passover provide a rich example
for exploring the Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and raise a host of tough questions regarding cost, safety, equal
treatment of prisoners, and establishment of religion. Because kosher-forPassover meals are more expensive and generally of higher quality than
regular prison fare, the prison must decide who is genuinely eligible and
who is merely seeking better food. In deciding which prisoners are sincere,
administrators tend to adopt rigid standards for what constitutes
appropriate religious observance and sometimes fail to credit prisoners’
individual beliefs. Beyond the formal legal issues of prisoners’ rights and
administrative protocol lies the deeply personal and symbolic meaning that
the Passover Seder has for those who are incarcerated. The irony of their

* The author wishes to thank Florida State University College of Law and the Center for Law,
Society, and Culture at Indiana University for inviting me to present workshops on this paper and
providing me with invaluable comments. Thanks also go to Professors Daniel Conkle, Steven
Friedell, Steve Johnson, Leandra Lederman, Seth Lahn, and Deborah Widiss, who read earlier drafts
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situation—celebrating a ritual of freedom inside prison—is not lost on
inmates who seek spiritual freedom even—and especially—in prison.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Using Passover observance in prison as a case study, this Article
examines the law regarding the religious rights of prisoners as well as the
spiritual and emotional significance of religious exercise for those who are
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incarcerated. It analyzes the interesting and complex issues posed by the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which is
far more protective of prisoners’ rights than is the First Amendment.
RLUIPA provides that: “No government shall impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution”
absent “a compelling governmental interest” that is advanced by “the least
restrictive means” available.1 The Act has been analyzed for its land use
aspect,2 but has not received the attention it deserves in the prison context.3
This Article examines the delicate balance of accommodating religion in
prison against the issues of cost, safety, and equal treatment of prisoners. It
also addresses issues of entanglement that arise when prison administrators
must decide who is genuinely eligible for special diets and other forms of
religious accommodation. It identifies several problems with the current
system, including the tendency of prison officials to adopt rigid religious
orthodoxies and disregard prisoners’ sincere individual beliefs.
Part II describes the Jewish holiday of Passover, and it explains the
ritual and significance of the Seder as well as the special dietary restrictions
of Passover. Part III discusses RLUIPA, presents the legal issues
surrounding religious exercise in prison generally, and analyzes the
arguments made by prison administrators who oppose expansive religious
1. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 3, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-1(a)
(2012).
2. See, e.g., Daniel P. Dalton, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person’s Act:
Recent Developments in RLUIPA’s Land Use Jurisprudence, 44 URB. LAW. 647 (2012); Jeffrey H.
Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLUIPA and the Mediation of Religious Land Use
Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435 (2006); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good:
The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311,
345–46 (2003); Note, Religious Land Use in The Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 2178 (2007); Ashira Perlman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons
from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 719–20 (2008); Christopher Serkin & Nelson
Tebbe, Condemning Religion: RLUIPA and the Politics of Eminent Domain, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 34 (2009); Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning
Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929 (2001).
3. Most of the discussion of prisoners’ rights under RLUIPA concerns individual cases, see, for
example, Harvard Law Review, First Amendment—Free Exercise in Prisons—Fifth Circuit Holds
That Prison’s Prohibition on All Objects over Twenty-Five Dollars Did Not Violate Prisoner’s First
Amendment Rights or Substantially Burden His Religion Under RLUIPA—Mcfaul V. Valenzuela,
684 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (2013), or issues of grooming, see, for
example, Dawinder S. Sidhu, Religious Freedom And Inmate Grooming Standards, 66 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 923, 964 (2012). But see Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501 (2005).
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rights for prisoners. Part IV examines the question of Passover observance
in prison, looking first at kosher food generally and then at the more rarified
and complex question of kosher-for-Passover food. Using the rich example
of Passover as a case study, it demonstrates the difficulty of balancing
religious accommodation with safe and orderly administration. Part V
examines Passover’s deep personal and symbolic meaning for those who are
incarcerated. Finally, Part VI uses the example of Passover observance in
prison to argue that cost alone should rarely, if ever, constitute a compelling
governmental interest strong enough to overcome a prisoner’s sincere
religious need. It also discusses prison officials’ entanglement with religion
and the dangers of providing one discrete minority with special privileges.
The Article concludes by tying together the legal and spiritual needs of
prisoners and suggesting further study of RLUIPA, particularly regarding
access to Halal food and anti-Muslim bias.
II. WHAT IS THIS?4
A. The Holiday of Passover
Passover celebrates the escape of the Jewish slaves from the land of
Egypt, commemorating the events portrayed in the biblical book of Exodus.5
4. “What is this?” is the question asked by the simple son, one of four archetypal sons
portrayed in the Haggadah (the traditional text of the Passover Seder)—the others are the wise son,
the wicked son, and the one who doesn’t know how to ask. Solomon Zeitlin, The Liturgy of the First
Night of Passover, 38 JEWISH Q. REV. 431 (1948). The simple son is answered with the explanation:
“By strength of the hand the Lord brought us out from Egypt out of the house of bondage.” Id. at
453–54 (internal quotations omitted). See infra notes 229–236 and accompanying text (discussing
the wicked son).
5. It is one of the triad of pilgrimage holidays to Jerusalem. See Daniel Kohn, Pilgrimage
Festivals, MY JEWISH LEARNING, http://www.myjewishlearning.com/holidays/About_Holidays/
Types_of_Holidays/Pilgrimage_Festivals.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
A major category of Jewish holidays is the pilgrimage festivals. Described in the Hebrew
Bible as celebrating both agricultural festivals and historical events in the history of the
Jewish people, these three holidays were set aside in biblical times for people to travel to
the ancient Temple in Jerusalem . . . . These three holidays are Passover, Shavuot, and
Sukkot.
Id. Passover is seven days long in Israel, see Exodus 12:14–15:
And this day shall be unto you for a memorial, and ye shall keep it a feast to the LORD;
throughout your generations ye shall keep it a feast by an ordinance for ever. Seven days
shall ye eat unleavened bread; howbeit the first day ye shall put away leaven out of your
houses; for whosoever eateth leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that
soul shall be cut off from Israel.
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Although many modern historians and archeologists dispute the existence of
a large Jewish slave revolt and subsequent exodus from Egypt,6 the story of
liberation from bondage has crucial cultural importance. It has become a
foundational myth of the Jews, explaining not only Jewish presence in the
land of Israel, but Jewish ethics as well. Ancient Jews needed to shed a
slave mentality to become free. Collective memory of slave experience
creates and justifies the core of Jewish dedication to social justice. For
instance, the commandment to be kind to the stranger, widow, and orphan is
grounded in the slave experience: Jews must have empathy for the
downtrodden, for they were once slaves in the land of Egypt.7 The Jewish
exodus from Egypt has become a western symbol for the transition from
slavery to freedom and, as such, has inspired many oppressed people—most
notably African slaves in the American South.8
Passover is an eight-day holiday in the diaspora to accommodate uncertainties in the ancient lunar
calendar. See Airela Pelaia, Passover Observance in Israel and the Diaspora: Seven Days or
Eight?, ABOUT, http://judaism.about.com/od/holidays/a/passoverdays.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
6. Although one could argue that the early Jews incorporated an exiled tribe from Egypt and
that Moses might have been a real historical figure, the overwhelming evidence from archaeology,
history, textual analysis, and hieroglyphics indicates that the original Jewish tribes formed in the
Canaanite area and grew by conquering the surrounding tribes. See Carol A. Redmount, Bitter
Lives: Israel in and out of Egypt, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BIBLICAL WORLD 58, 62–64
(Michael Coogan ed., 2001) (“[S]cholars of all critical schools agree that the Exodus account as it
stands today is a composite, a literary construct, carefully composed and edited to achieve historical
and theological coherence. . . . In the end, the Exodus saga is neither pure history nor pure literature,
but an inseparable amalgam of both, closest in form to what we would call a docudrama.”). Rather
than an historical account, the exodus story can be understood as part of the ideology of specialness
and divine promise that bolstered the Canaan conquests. The anti-Egyptian flavor of the exodus
narrative can be explained by the fact that when the book of Exodus was written (centuries after the
alleged events occurred) Egypt was the main rival and enemy of the Persian Empire (where the Jews
lived). See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE EVOLUTION OF GOD (2009).
7. See Deuteronomy 24:17–18 (“You shall not subvert the rights of the stranger or the
fatherless; you shall not take a widow’s garment in pawn. Remember that you were a slave in Egypt
and that the Lord your God redeemed you from there; therefore do I enjoin you to observe this
commandment.”); Aurora Mendelsohn, From the Civil War to Our Seders, a Song of Redemption,
JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Apr. 15, 2011, at 11 (discussing the establishment of the Freedom Seder
in 1969, which ritually connected the “Passover story to American slavery, the struggle for civil
rights and our present-day obligations to end oppression”); see also Kelly Adams, A Prayerful
Passover; Congregation Kol Ami Recalls Freeing of Jews, Suffering in Darfur, COLUMBIAN, Apr.
14, 2006, at A1 (discussing a Seder in which participants “prayed for the end of the genocide in
Darfur in the African nation of Sudan,” and noting that “it is also traditional to remember those less
fortunate during Passover”).
8. See ARTHUR O. WASKOW & PHYLLIS O. BERMAN, FREEDOM JOURNEYS: THE TALE OF
EXODUS AND WILDERNESS ACROSS MILLENNIA (2011) (describing how the Passover story has been
adapted and used by African-American, Christian, and Muslim communities to provide insight and

65

[Vol. 41: 61, 2013]

Once We Were Slaves, Now We Are Free
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

B. The Seder
The central ritual of Passover is the Seder, in which participants—
including small children—sit around the dining table with extended family
and guests to retell the story of the escape from bondage.9 The Seder, which
literally means “order,”10 is organized and directed by the Haggadah—the
traditional textual guide to the Seder.11 As they read from the Haggadah,
which literally means “the telling,”12 participants recount the story of the
freedom from the Pharaoh’s oppression, sing songs praising God, drink four
cups of wine, and enjoy a feast.13 The Haggadah, which developed over
centuries, has a standardized text drawn from Biblical and later rabbinical
sources, but the commentary and illustrations vary among versions.14
Central to the opulent table is the Seder plate, a special platter of symbolic
inspiration).
9. Traditionally, “the eating of the paschal lamb was to be participated in by a number of
people—there was to be a family feast.” Zeitlin, supra note 4, at 432.
10. See Love v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. 10–1714, 2011 WL 345964, at *4 n.10 (D.N.J. Jan. 31,
2011) (“A Seder (meaning, in Hebrew, an ‘order’ or ‘arrangement’) is a Jewish religious ritual
marking the Jewish holiday of Passover. The Seder ritual includes, inter alia, the consumption of a
specific meal.”) (quoting http://www.beingJewish.com/yomtov/passover/schedule1.html).
In
modern Hebrew, “b’seder” means “okay,” as in “everything is in order.” See Cool Hebrew Phrases,
JEWISH CMTY. FED’N, http://www.jewishrichmond.org/page.aspx?id=137886 (last visited Oct. 8,
2013).
11. The Haggadah starts with a table of contents, which is often the first song of the Seder. See
MENACHEM M. SCHNEERSON, THE PASSOVER HAGGADAH 4 (Yosef Marcus ed., J. Immanuel
Schochet trans., 1999). It directs the various activities around the table, only one of which is the
actual meal. Id. The central part of the Haggadah is magid, literally “the teller,” in which the
exodus story is retold. See id. at 7–21. The magid has set pieces—the classic four questions sung by
the youngest child who is able to do so, and an account of the four sons (wise, wicked, simple, and
he who is unable to ask), including how the ritual is explained to each one. Id. at 9. The text makes
clear that the sources provided in the Haggadah are intended as a starting point of discussion, not a
rote run-through. Id. at vii. “All who elaborate upon the telling of the tale of the exodus from
Egypt, are to be praised.” See David Arnow, Creating Lively Passover Seders, JEWISH
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 1 (2004), available at http://www.jtsa.edu/Documents/pagedocs/Commun
ications/Passover/2009BetAm.pdf.
12. The term Haggadah comes from the Biblical verse, “V’Higadita l’vanecha” (“and you shall
tell your children”). Exodus 13:8; See Zalman Schachter-Shalomi, Haggadah: Telling and
Empowering, REB ZALMAN LEGACY PROJECT, http://www.jewishrenewalhasidus.org/wordpress/
?p=63 (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
13. See SCHNEERSON, supra note 11, at 7–21.
14. Amazon.com boasts over 1,000 different Haggadahs, including those designed especially for
children, Christians, feminists, scholars, follows of the Kabbalah, and oddly enough, Americans.
See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_i_0_10?url=search-alias%3Daps&fieldkeywords=passover+haggadah&sprefix=Passover+H%2Caps%2C163 (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
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foods.15 These foods include bitter herbs that serve as a reminder of slavery
and greens representing renewal and hope, dipped in salt-water to represent
the slaves’ tears.16 The learning around the table is not just visual and
auditory, but also kinesthetic and experiential—one might even say
gastronomic.
The Seder raises and portrays issues of liminality, posing questions
about the borders between free/imprisoned, Jew/non-Jew, and
spiritual/physical. Even outside of prisons, the Seder ritual encompasses the
tension of order/chaos,17 tradition/innovation, and collectivity/individuality.
This last tension arises because the Seder is a time for family and for
collective celebration and affiliation with co-religionists, but it also focuses
on individual experience. As the Haggadah instructs, “In every generation a
person is obligated to regard himself as if he had come out of Egypt.”18
C. Special Dietary Restrictions
The one food not found at the Seder (or throughout Passover for that
matter) is bread, which is forbidden during the weeklong holiday.19
Numerous rules control observant Jews’ diets throughout the week of

15. The Seder plate includes: a roasted egg as a symbol of spring, fertility, and eternity; a roast
lamb shank reminiscent of the sacrificial paschal lamb and God’s “strong hand and outstretched
arm,” Exodus 5:12, with which God freed the slaves; bitter herbs; greens; charoset, a mixture of
fruit, nuts, and wine ground into a paste designed to resemble the mortar used by the slaves in their
labor; and in some traditions, an orange—meant to prompt questions and in response to the antifeminist assertion that “women belong on the bimah—the stage at a synagogue—as much as an
orange belongs on the seder plate.” Laurel Ramseyer, An Orange on the Seder Plate, PAM’S HOUSE
BLEND (Apr. 19, 2011), http://pamshouseblend.firedoglake.com/2011/04/19/an-orange-on-the-sederplate/.
16. See supra note 15.
17. The four cups of wine may contribute to the chaos.
18. See SCHNEERSON, supra note 11, at 20.
19. Bread and all leavened products are forbidden. See Passover 101: What You Need to Know,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2008, 8:01 AM), http://www.today.com/id/23884119/ns/todaytoday_food/t/passover-what-you-need-to-know/#.UjCpssakqNg (explaining the dietary restrictions
that take effect during Passover). The dietary rules are extraordinarily complicated and rigidly
enforced. See infra note 144. Unlike normal rules of keeping kosher, during Passover there is no de
minimis test for tolerating adulteration. Id. Any amount of leavening renders the food unkosher for
Passover. Id. In this respect, civil law, which recognizes the notion of substantial compliance and
thus allows for some flexibility in complying with contract provisions and court orders, does not
comport with Jewish practice. See Miles v. Aramark Corr. Serv., 236 F. App’x 746 (3d Cir. 2007)
(finding substantial compliance with court decree ordering Passover food for prisoner even though
some bread and some iced tea made with corn syrup appeared on his tray).
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Passover, requiring elimination of all leavened products (not just bread).20
Sephardic Jews21 have fewer restrictions, but Ashkenazi Jews do not eat rice,
barley, corn, beans, or soybeans.22 The ban on chametz, leavened products,
literally “soured” products, extends to perfume and other non-edible items; it
applies to anything that gives pleasure.23 The restrictions generate a buying
frenzy of goods in an inelastic market of specialty items marked with a “P”
for Passover.24 Leavened products cannot be consumed, enjoyed, or even
owned—Jews must sell them or give them away before Passover.25 The
weeks before Passover thus entails major spring-cleaning.26 The day before
Passover, the last remnants of chametz are burned.27 Many see the burning
of chametz as symbolic of new beginnings and an end to sourness.28
The central food of the holiday is matzah, the unleavened bread that was
the food of the slaves.29 As the Jewish tradition explains, the slaves were so
eager to leave that they did not wait for the bread to rise before they escaped
the Pharaoh.30 Matzah, the bread of affliction, was thus transformed into a

20. See sources cited supra note 19.
21. Sephardic Jews trace their heritage from Spain; Portugal; and Middle Eastern, North
African, and Arab countries. See AVIVA BEN-UR, SEPHARDIC JEWS IN AMERICA: A DIASPORIC
HISTORY 6 (2009) (defining Sephardic Jews as those who descended from Spanish- and Portuguesespeaking Jews of Western Europe and Ladino-speaking Jews of the Ottoman Empire, and discussing
Mizrahi Jews (those coming from Arab lands) as descendants of the Sephardic Jews).
22. These foods are designated as kitniyot based on the concerns that the harvest time is similar,
all are ground into flours that are hard to distinguish one from another, and some small amount of
wheat or other grain might have mixed in.
See What is Kitniyot?, OUKOSHER,
http://oukosher.org/passover/articles/what-is-kitniyot/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
23. See On Chametz and Matza, VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH, http://www.vbm-torah.org/pesach/
chametz.htm (explaining the significance of chametz).
24. See Jason Perlow, Kosher for Passover Coke: It’s the Real Thing Baby, OFF THE BROILER
(Mar. 25, 2006), http://offthebroiler.wordpress.com/2009/03/27/kosher-for-passover-coke-its-thereal-thing-baby/. In some major United States cities with large Jewish populations, it is possible to
get kosher-for-Passover Coca-Cola, which is made with sugar instead of high-fructose corn syrup
and prepared in a specially cleaned bottling plant. Id.
25. See supra note 19.
26. See, e.g., Hints for Pesach Cleaning, OUKOSHER.ORG, http://oukosher.org/index.php/pass
over/article/hints_for_pesach_cleaning/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (reminding cleaners: “Don’t forget
to clean brooms, vacuum cleaners, clothing pockets, car and garage.”).
27. See Chametz’s Final Moments: The Burning of the Chametz, Chabad, http://www.cha
bad.org/holidays/passover/pesach_cdo/aid/117223/jewish/Chametzs-Final-Moments.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2013).
28. Id.
29. See sources cited supra note 19.
30. See sources cited supra note 19.
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symbol of freedom.31
D. Religious Needs of Prisoners on Passover
Because of its ties to food, family, and tradition, Passover is the most
observed Jewish holiday—even more than Judaism’s holiest day, Yom
Kippur, the Day of Atonement.32 Jewish prisoners celebrating Passover may
desire different levels of services and religious observance. At the very
least, Jewish prisoners desire a Seder replete with a Haggadah, Seder plate,
and matzah.33 More traditionally observant Jews would insist on the
prescribed stringent dietary restrictions throughout the weeklong holiday.
III. RELIGIOUS EXERCISE IN PRISON GENERALLY
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens
from governmental interference in their exercise of religion.34 The reach of
the constitutional Free Exercise Clause is tempered by the Establishment
Clause in the same Amendment, which prohibits the making of any “law
respecting an establishment of religion.”35 The line between government’s
appropriate fostering of free exercise of religion and its impermissible
establishment is a complicated one. Administrative and security concerns
further muddy the doctrine and policy of free exercise in prisons. Although
prisoners still possess civil rights, those rights are substantially limited by
their institutionalization.36
31. See sources cited supra note 18.
32. See Nancy Ammerman, Religious Identities in Contemporary American Life: Lessons from
the NJPS, 67 SOC. OF RELIGION 359, 363 (2006) (besides Hanukkah, which comes during the
Christmas season, the other religious holiday that unaffiliated Jews are most likely to celebrate is
Passover). As one rabbi who is a chaplain in prisons explained, “A lot of Jews aren’t observant, but
when it comes to Passover, everyone shows up.” Lindsay Melvin, Passover in Prison: Holiday a
Busy Time for Rabbi Levi Klein Who Ministers to the Incarcerated, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Apr. 16,
2011), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/apr/16/passover-in-prison/.
33. See generally Miles v. Aramark Corr. Serv., 236 F. App’x 746 (3d Cir. 2007) (providing an
example of how prisoners may wish to celebrate Passover).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. Id.
36. See Ward v. Rabideau, 732 F. Supp. 2d 162, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). The court held that
when prison regulation impinges on prisoners’ constitutional rights, such regulations are valid if they
reasonably are related to legitimate penological interests: “[S]uch a standard is necessary ‘if prison
administrators, and not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional
operations.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977).
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A. Struggle Between Congress and the Courts
The modern history of religious free exercise began with the 1990 case
Employment Division v. Smith, in which the Supreme Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to an Oregon statute.37 Smith ultimately turned on the
validity of a criminal law as applied to sacramental peyote use by Native
Americans.38 The Court held that, although the petitioners possessed a
sincere religious interest in peyote use during their religious ceremony, the
State of Oregon’s legitimate and neutrally applied drug ban did not run afoul
of the Free Exercise Clause.39 Smith held that the First Amendment does not
prohibit the government from burdening religious practices through neutral,
generally applicable laws.40
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), which applied to prisons among many other diverse venues and
greatly expanded the religious exercise rights of prisoners.41 In a responsive
volley four years later, the Supreme Court decided City of Boerne v. Flores,
which held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states.42 The RFRA
protections for prisoners’ religious rights in federal (as opposed to state)
prisons, however, remained undisturbed.43
1. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(“RLUIPA”)
In 2000, Congress tried again to enact protections for religious practice
that would apply to the states and not run afoul of the Constitution. It passed
by unanimous consent the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
37. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-1(a) (2012), as recognized in Sossamon v.
Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
38. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–83, 890.
39. Id. at 877–82.
40. Id. at 890. Smith rejected the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause announced in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and held that the Constitution does not require judges to
engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–90.
41. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), invalidated by City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
42. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (holding that RFRA unconstitutionally exceeded Congress’s
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
43. See id. at 509.
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Act (“RLUIPA”), an odd hybrid that addresses two unrelated issues: land
use and prisoners’ rights.44 As the Supreme Court has explained, “RLUIPA
borrows important elements from RFRA—which continues to apply to the
federal government—but RLUIPA is less sweeping in scope.”45 RLUIPA’s
heightened protection stemmed from Congress’s recognition that the right of
inmates (and other institutionalized persons) to practice their faith is “at the
mercy of those running the institution.”46
RLUIPA applies a form of strict scrutiny to restrictions on the use of
land by religious institutions and protects the religious rights of prisoners
and other people confined by the government to institutions. In relevant part
RLUIPA provides that: “No government shall impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution”
absent “a compelling governmental interest” that is advanced by “the least
restrictive means” available.47
The Ninth Circuit held that “a burden is substantial under RLUIPA
when the state denies an important benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”48 The Third Circuit
explained that
a substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to choose
between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting
benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus
abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a
benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an
adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his

44. Gaubatz, supra note 3, at n.6 (2005). RLUIPA relies on the Spending and Commerce
Clauses for its Constitutional authority. One author has noted that RLUIPA raises significant issues
of federalism, but it so far has survived—or avoided—constitutional challenges addressing these
concerns. DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 111–12 (2d ed.,
2009) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005), which noted but did not reach the
argument that RLUIPA exceeds congressional constitutional authority).
45. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1656 (2011).
46. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy—
two sponsors of RLUIPA).
47. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 3, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-1(a)
(2012).
48. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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beliefs.49
Not every limitation will present a substantial burden. For instance, a
California prison’s restriction on third-party purchases of prayer oil was held
not to substantially burden the prisoner’s ability to practice his religion.50
RLUIPA is aimed at government obstructions of religious practice; it does
not require the state to provide devotional accessories.51
RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as including “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.”52 “The practice burdened need not be central to the adherent’s belief
system, but the adherent must have an honest belief that the practice is
important to his free exercise of religion.”53 The broad definition of
religious exercise was intended to counter the narrow interpretation of the
circuit courts in the four years that RFRA applied to the states.54 Although
RLUIPA prohibits “inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is
‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion,” it “does not preclude inquiry into the
sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity.”55
RLUIPA provides an express private cause of action for “appropriate
relief against a government,”56 including against states, their
instrumentalities and officers, and persons “acting under color of State
law.”57 Until recently, an interesting, unresolved question split the circuits
concerning whether prisoners suing under RLUIPA could receive money

49. Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone,
600 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010) (providing an in-depth analysis of the definition of substantial
burden: “(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief, or (2)
prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3) places
substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held
religious belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief”).
50. Smith v. Marshall, 453 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2011).
51. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 n.8 (2005).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
53. Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Sossamon 2009]; cf.
Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A prison is entitled to ensure that a given
claim reflects a sincere religious belief, rather than a preference for the way a given diet tastes, a
belief that the preferred diet is less painful for animals, or a prisoner’s desire to make a pest of
himself and cause trouble for his captors.”).
54. Gaubatz, supra note 3, at 505.
55. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A).
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damages from the state.58 The Supreme Court, in Sossamon v. Texas,59
resolved the split—holding that in accepting federal funding, states do not
automatically consent to a waiver of sovereign immunity, and thus RLUIPA
does not provide for private monetary damages.60 Furthermore, at least three
circuits have held that RLUIPA does not authorize any monetary relief
against public officials in their personal capacities.61 Others have not
reached the question whether RLUIPA authorizes individual-capacity claims
for damages, but have offered qualified immunity to prison officials.62 If a
prisoner is already out of jail, or is currently receiving the religious
accommodation he was denied, his case for equitable relief under RLUIPA
will be dismissed as moot.63 Inmates must exhaust administrative remedies
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)64 before suing
58. See Florer v. Bales-Johnson, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1205-06 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (discussing
split in the circuits).
59. 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1654 (2011). Sossamon did not address Congress’ authority to enact
RLUIPA under the Spending Clause. Id. at 1656 n.1.
60. Id. at 1660. Suits against state employees in their official capacity are treated as suits
against the states themselves. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 59 (1989).
61. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Construing RLUIPA to
provide for damages actions against officials in their individual capacities would raise serious
questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause.”);
Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 329 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that congressional enactments
pursuant to the Spending Clause do not impose direct liability on an individual who is not a party to
the contract between the state and federal government), aff’d, 131 S.Ct. 1651 (2011); Rendelman v.
Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t would be a novel use of the spending clause to
condition the receipt of federal funds on the creation of an individual capacity damages action.”);
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ection 3 of RLUIPA—a provision that
derives from Congress’ Spending Power—cannot be construed as creating a private action against
individual defendants for monetary damages.”), abrogated on other grounds in Sossamon, 131 S.Ct.
1651 (2011). Various district courts have so held. See Wakefield v. Indermill, No. 1:09–cv–00274–
LJO–BAM PC, 2011 WL 5876246, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp.
2d 477, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F. Supp. 2d 952, 967 (D.S.D. 2008); Garrison v.
Dutcher, No. 1:07–cv–642, 2008 WL 938159, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2008); Horacek v.
Burnett, No. 07–11865, 2008 WL 4427825, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2008). However, other
courts permit individual capacity claims to proceed under RLUIPA. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d
878 (9th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2006); Farnsworth v. Baxter, No.
03–2950–B/V, 2007 WL 2793364, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2007).
62. See, e.g., Hall v. Ekpe, 428 Fed. Appx. 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2011).
63. See, e.g., Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 798–99 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that RLUIPA
injunctive relief claim based on prison’s policy of not offering kosher meals rendered moot when
prisoner transferred to another facility that provided kosher meals); Whitfield v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 06–cv–00968, 2011 WL 5282639, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2011).
64. Prison Litigation Reform Act § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). The PLRA requires
exhaustion of “all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
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under RLUIPA.65 This has the effect of dismissing many otherwise viable
claims.66
To make a claim under RLUIPA, the institutionalized person must
produce prima facie evidence to support a claim, showing that the
government practice substantially burdens the person’s exercise of religion.67
If the prisoner makes that initial showing, the government then bears the
burden of persuasion in providing a compelling interest and demonstrating
that its action is narrowly tailored to that compelling purpose.68 For
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 517 (2002). The PLRA also limits federal civil action for mental or emotional injury
to cases with physical injury under 42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(e), places a limit on attorneys’ fees to 150%
of the Criminal Justice Act Rate under 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(d), and requires filing fees—even under
the in forma pauperis provision, with special limitations for those who have already filed three prior
claims that were deemed frivolous. See JOHN BOSTON, The Prison Litigation Reform Act:
Considerations in Individual Litigation, in PRISON LAW 2010 283, 316–17 (2010). However, some
Courts have questioned whether the limitation of damages to cases of physical injury can fairly
apply to First Amendment claims. See Horacek, 2008 WL 4427825, at *10 (“[S]ince First
Amendment violations rarely, if ever, result in physical injuries, construction of the PLRA against
recovery of damages would defeat congressional intent and render constitutional protections
meaningless.”) (quoting Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2006)).
65. RLUIPA provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or repeal the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(e) (2012).
66. See, e.g., Parnell v. Tucker, 458 Fed. App’x 581 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting prisoner’s claim
under RLUIPA for being prohibited from congregating with other Muslims for prayer because
prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies); Scott v. Kelly, No. 1:11cv25 (AJT/TCB),
2011 WL 6046400 (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011) (denying prisoner’s challenge to rule that prisoners had
to have ninety consecutive days without a disciplinary charge to attend religious services); Williams
v. Cate, No. 1:09–cv–00468 OWW JLT (PC), 2011 WL 1121965 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011)
(denying request for kosher-for-Passover food because prisoner had not exhausted his administrative
remedies). There is ample evidence in RLUIPA cases of administrators failing to respond or
otherwise sitting on grievances to stymie compliance with PLRA. See, e.g., Mootry v. Flores, No.
1:09–cv–01252-LJO-BAM PC, 2011 WL 5593170, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011) (recounting the
administration’s screening out grievances claiming they were merely requests for information and
hence not appealable).
67. Willis v. Commissioner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 768, 776 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (citing § 2000cc–2(b)).
68. Id. (citations omitted). See also Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004)
(restating that an inmate must prove (i) the burdened activity is a “religious exercise,” (ii) the burden
is “substantial,” and (iii) the belief is sincerely held; then the burden shifts to the government to
prove (i) that the burden is supported by a compelling interest, and (ii) that the burden is the least
restrictive means of carrying out that interest); Pittman-Bey v. Clay, No. V–10–086, 2011 WL
6749027, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2011) (“In order to make a RLUIPA claim, a prisoner must
initially show that the prison’s regulations imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of religious
activity. . . . If a plaintiff meets his burden of proof, the burden shifts to the government to
‘demonstrate that its action was supported by a compelling interest and that the regulation is the least
restrictive means of carrying out that interest.’”) (citations omitted).
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example, even though an avowed Satanist held sincere religious beliefs that
were burdened by the prison’s decision not to allow him to conduct
fellowship services, the practices and principles of Satanism created a risk to
the safety and security of the prison that met the compelling interest
standard.69 The plaintiff retains “the burden of persuasion on whether the
law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the
claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.”70 In Spratt v.
Rhode Island Department of Corrections, the First Circuit summarized the
elements of such a claim and articulated the shifting burden.71
[A] claim under RLUIPA includes four elements. On the first two
elements, (1) that an institutionalized person’s religious exercise has
been burdened and (2) that the burden is substantial, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof . . . . Once a plaintiff has established that
his religious exercise has been substantially burdened, the onus
shifts to the government to show (3) that the burden furthers a
compelling governmental interest and (4) that the burden is the least
restrictive means of achieving that compelling interest.72
2. Cutter v. Wilkinson
In response to a challenge in 2003, the Supreme Court, in Cutter v.
Wilkinson, held that RLUIPA is facially constitutional.73 In Cutter,
Satanists, Wiccans, members of Asatru (a German neopagan religion), and
69. Cookson v. Me. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:10–cv–00256–JAW, 2012 WL 32378 (D. Me. Jan. 4,
2012). The court quoted “The Eleven Satanic Rules of the Earth,” which dictate among other things
that “[i]f a guest in your lair annoys you, treat him cruelly and without mercy” and “[i]f someone
bothers you, ask him to stop. If he does not stop, destroy him.” Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
70. RLUIPA Section 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2012).
71. 482 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2007).
72. Id. at 38 (citing RLUIPA). Compelling really means compelling, not just reasonable or
convincing. For instance, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006) (a RFRA case), the Court held that the government failed to show a compelling interest
in prohibiting a religious sect from consuming hoasca, a hallucinogenic substance. As many courts
have observed, the standard for adjudicating a governmental interest compelling is the same under
RFRA and RLUIPA. See, e.g., Turner-Bey v. Maynard, No. Civ.A. JFM-10-2816, 2012 WL
4327282 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2012); Ali v. Quaterman, No. 9:09CV52, 2010 WL 3790829 (E.D. Tex.
July 20, 2010) (“[A]lthough RFRA had been struck down, the compelling governmental
interest/least restrictive means test was carried over from RFRA to RLUIPA.”).
73. 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005).
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members of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian (the religious arm of the
Aryan Nations) challenged an Ohio prison’s restrictions on their religious
practices.74 For purposes of litigation at the early stage in which the issues
arose,75 prison officials stipulated that inmates were members of bona fide
religions and were sincere in their religious beliefs.76 The State of Ohio
argued that RLUIPA is facially unconstitutional because it advances religion
in violation of the Establishment Clause,77 and maintained that
accommodation of the prisoners’ requests would encourage religiosity
among other inmates to secure the requested benefits, thereby devolving into
a fostering of religion.78
Cutter held that RLUIPA was not facially unconstitutional but
affirmatively acknowledged that RLUIPA would be subject to as-applied
challenges in prison management.79 The opinion added in dicta that
RLUIPA does not “elevate accommodation of religious observances over an
institution’s need to maintain order and safety.”80 In “applying RLUIPA,
courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries . . . and they must be
satisfied that the Act’s prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally
among different faiths . . . .”81 Finally, “[s]hould inmate requests for
religious accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on
other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an
institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition.”82
3. Suits Under the First Amendment
It is still possible for a prisoner to sue under the First Amendment.83 As
74. Id. at 712.
75. The case arrived in the Supreme Court based on the circuit court’s determination that the
case should have ended under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) by a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713.
76. Id.
77. Id. Another objection to RLUIPA, based on a federalism issue, was not addressed in Cutter.
See id. at 718 n.7.
78. Id. at 721 n.10.
79. Id. at 721, 725.
80. Id. at 722.
81. Id. at 720 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 726.
83. In state courts, challengers may bring an action based on the First Amendment under 42
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the Supreme Court explained, prisoners do not lose their right to free
exercise of their religion because of their incarceration.84 “However, the
circumstances of prison life may require some restrictions on prisoners’
exercise of their religious beliefs.”85 In judging free exercise claims based
on the First Amendment, courts have tended to be highly deferential to
prison authorities. The standard under the First Amendment requires only
that there be a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation and
the underlying legitimate government interest.86 The government’s objective
must be legitimate and neutral.87 For instance, in O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, Muslim inmates challenged a prison policy that prevented some
Muslim inmates assigned to outside work detail from attending a weekly
Friday prayer service.88 The Court found a valid, logical connection89
between the policy of requiring inmates to remain with their work details
and the goal of simulating work conditions and responsibilities in society.90
The Court also found that accommodating the inmates’ desire to return for
Friday prayers would have unduly affected other inmates, prison personnel,
and the allocation of prison resources.91 The Court rejected a strict or
U.S.C. § 1983, and in federal court as a Bivens action. (See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creating the federal equivalent of a § 1983 claim)). It is
possible to sue both under the statute—RFRA in federal court and RLUIPA in state court—as well
as under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Jihad v. Fabian, No. 09–1604 (SRN/LIB), 2011 WL
1641885 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2011).
84. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)
(“[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and
confinement in prison.”).
85. Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1985).
86. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (holding that
prison regulations must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests to withstand a
constitutional challenge).
87. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551.
88. 482 U.S. 342, 346 (1987).
89. Florer v. Bales-Johnson, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1202 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (“RLUIPA
provides greater protection than the First Amendment by protecting activities that an offender
sincerely believes are central to his religion, rather than just those activities which are central to his
religion as determined by the tenets of that religion.”).
90. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350–51.
91. Id. at 352–53. Work details were supervised by a single guard, which meant an entire crew
would have to be brought back to the prison to satisfy a single inmate’s desire to attend the service,
thereby disrupting work schedules and increasing the security risks near the gate. Id. at 351. The
Court noted that the prison provides multiple accommodations to Muslim inmates, including
opportunities for alternative religious services, a state-provided imam who had free access to the
prison, different meals whenever pork was served in the cafeteria, and special meal arrangements
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heightened standard,92 explaining: “To ensure that courts afford appropriate
deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations
alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’
test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
fundamental constitutional rights.”93 O’Lone made clear that great deference
would be shown to prison administrators’ judgment.94 Courts will often
construe a pro se claim for a religious diet as a RLUIPA claim, but not
always, and where the prisoner asserts only a free exercise claim, he will
lose.95
Though a statute, RLUIPA provides significantly more protection for
prisoners’ religious exercise than does the First Amendment.96 Before the
enactment of RLUIPA, courts recognized the right to a kosher diet under the
First Amendment,97 but the standard under RLUIPA is much more protective
of prisoners. Indeed, RLUIPA provides prisoners more religious free
exercise protection than average citizens receive.98
during the month-long observance of Ramadan, including a pre-sunrise breakfast and a post-sunset
dinner. Id. at 352.
92. See Gaubatz, supra note 3 at 507–08.
93. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
94. Id. (“In considering the appropriate balance of these factors, we have often said that
evaluation of penological objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison
administrators, ‘who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution
under examination.’” (citations omitted)); see Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 984
(8th Cir. 2004) (First Amendment not violated by prison’s refusal to allow meetings of religious
group believing in segregation and Caucasian supremacy, because policy was reasonably related to
legitimate interest in security; however, RLUIPA may still be violated if prisoner’s rights were
substantially violated and there are less restrictive means available).
95. See, e.g., Jordan v. Fuller, 507 Fed. App’x 752 (10th Cir. 2013).
96. See Gardner v. Riska, 444 Fed. App’x 353, 354 (11th Cir. 2011) (“More expansive than
prisoners’ rights under the First Amendment, RLIUPA ‘affords to prison inmates a heightened
protection.’”) (citation omitted); Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 651 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding
that even if allowed under the Free Exercise Clause, a prison’s actions may not be allowed under
RLUIPA); Pittman-Bey v. Clay, No. V–10–086, 2011 WL 6749027, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2011)
(“‘RLUIPA imposes a higher burden than does the First Amendment in that the statute requires
prison regulators to put forth a stronger justification for regulations that impinge on the religious
practices of inmates.’”) (quoting Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 612 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
97. See, e.g., Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that prisoners have a
“clearly established” right “to a diet consistent with [their] religious scruples”); Bass v. Coughlin,
976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (reaffirming Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir. 1975) (finding that Orthodox Jewish inmate had right to provision of kosher meals)).
98. Spencer T. Proffitt, Gods Behind Bars: How Religious Liberty Has Been Sent Directly to
Jail, and How to Get Out of Jail Free, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1401, 1401, 1427 (“[T]he nation has come
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A good illustration of the application of the various remedies is
presented in Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,
where the prisoner was disciplined for conducting afternoon prayer in a
corner of the prison kitchen.99 The Third Circuit held that the prison did not
violate Williams’s First Amendment rights because the prison possessed
legitimate interests “in maintaining institutional order and security . . . and
that those interests were rationally connected to the institutional policy that
inmates must obey orders and may not be present in an unauthorized
area.”100 The same action by the prison administration failed RLUIPA
because it “heightens the protection from burdens on religious exercise.”101
Williams’s religious exercise was substantially burdened—he was “forced to
choose between offering prayers in the manner consistent with his religious
belief and being disciplined for being in an unauthorized area or for refusing
to obey an order.”102 Furthermore, the prison did not seek out the least
restrictive means of furthering its compelling government interest because it
did not investigate other potential nearby venues for Williams to pray.103
Prisoners may still wish to sue under the First Amendment as well, however,
because it offers a chance to secure monetary damages in addition to the
injunctive relief available under RLUIPA.104

to a topsy-turvy situation where convicted criminals actually have more protection for their religious
liberty than free citizens do . . . . The decisions of Smith II, Flores, and Cutter combine to create the
Prisoner’s Paradox—where such claims made by convicted criminals are analyzed under the more
protective strict scrutiny, while those made by law-abiding citizens are instead determined using the
more government-deferential rational basis scrutiny.”).
99. 450 F. App’x 191 (3d Cir. 2011).
100. Id. at 195.
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 196.
103. Id.; see also Hayes v. Tennessee, 424 Fed. App’x 546, 548 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that
confiscation of religious literature containing messages of white supremacy and racial purity, such as
“the Bible is the genesis of, the history of, and the prophecy for, the WHITE RACE only and the
Jews are the mongrelized descendants of Satan through Cain” did not violate the First Amendment
but that a genuine issue of material fact existed under RLUIPA as to whether prison used the least
restrictive means) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Getting such damages is difficult. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, No. 10–21435–CIV–
HUCK, 2010 WL 3199878, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2010) (finding against compensation for
emotional distress of prisoner after finding out he was served food that was not kosher-for-Passover
as he had been assured the food was).
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B. Concerns by Prison Administrators—Legitimate and Questionable
As a practical matter, it is interesting to speculate why prison
administrators would want to discourage or subvert religious observance by
inmates. Aside from constitutional scruples concerning the establishment of
religion, why would prison administrators object to prisoners’ free exercise?
If one’s image of religious exercise in prison conjures up born-again
Christians seeking to make amends using the model of Prison Fellowship, a
Christian ministry dedicated to bring a message of contrition to prisoners,105
then the prison administrators’ opposition is indeed puzzling. A religion of
contrition that squarely places blame on the inmate for his crimes might
appeal to administrators (who undoubtedly would find contrite prisoners
easier to handle).106 Contrast that, however, with other religions whose
tenets may not similarly foster acceptance of prison hierarchy. For instance,
the Nation of Islam—a famously unpopular religion with wardens—is
confrontational with prison administration, blaming society and the prison
system—not the individual prisoners—for the prisoners’ crimes.107 The
Nation of Islam organizes prison inmates to be disciplined in resistance to
prison authority.108 Historically, Jehovah’s Witnesses, who do not recognize
secular authority, also subvert prison administrators.109 There is no reason to
suppose that religiously motivated action will inure necessarily to the benefit
of the rulers and jailers—consider Jesus of Nazareth’s defiance of Roman
105. The late Chuck Colson, one of Nixon’s “Watergate seven,” founded Prison Fellowship.
See Career Opportunities, PRISON FELLOWSHIP, http://www.prisonfellowship.org/about/careers (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013). The mission of Prison Fellowship is “to seek the transformation of prisoners
and their reconciliation to God, family, and community though the power and truth of Jesus Christ.”
See id. According to the Statement of Faith of Prison Fellowship Ministries, “We believe that all
people are lost sinners and cannot see the Kingdom of God except through the new birth.” See
Statement of Faith, PRISON FELLOWSHIP, http://www.prisonfellowship.org/about/statement-of-faith/
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
106. See Religious Services, STATE OF DEL., http://doc.delaware.gov/religiousServices.shtml
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (“Religious services and programs promote high morals, encourage
positive lifestyle changes and can play a critical role in an inmate’s rehabilitation.”).
107. See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, Faith as Liberation: The Nation of Islam and Religion in
Prison, 1940–1975, in THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
MODERN AMERICA 97 (2010) (“[T]he Nation offered prisoners meaning and direction through faith.
It also offered a path to resistance and self-expression that could not be matched by other beliefs.”).
108. Malcolm X, who converted to the Nation of Islam, discussed the role of prison in the
Nation of Islam faith—explaining that the black prisoner symbolized the white society’s oppression
of black men. Id. at 110.
109. Id. at 97.
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authority.
Given that religious devotion among prisoners may indeed be a mixed
bag for their jailers, the next sections examine the justifications that prison
administrators offer for limiting prisoners’ religious exercise.
The
discussion is divided between concerns that seem reasonable and those that
seem petty or pretextual.
1. Reasonable Concerns of Jailers
Cutter, which considered the facial constitutionality of RLUIPA,
illustrates legitimate concerns that unfettered free exercise by some religious
groups could create tension and danger in the prison.110 One of the plaintiffs
in Cutter was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, which
supports tenets of white supremacy and is devoted to preserving and
promoting the white race.111 It is easy to see why the gathering of members
of this white supremacist group for regular prayer meetings might alarm
prison officials and frighten non-white or non-Christian inmates.
Even if prison administrators have no objections to the tenets or
activities of a religious group per se, and the religious practice will cause no
outrage or strife, other legitimate concerns arise. Prison officials might raise
concerns about the logistics of accommodating religious observance in
prison. Participating in sweat lodges112 or lighting incense113 can raise safety
110. Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
111. See Brief for Respondents at 5–6, Cutter v. Wilkerson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (No. 03–9877).
The Aryan Nation’s Church of Jesus Christ Christian believes “in the preservation of our Race,
individually and collectively, as a people as demanded and directed by God.” Richard G. Butler,
Who, What, Why, When, Where: Aryan Nations, ARYAN NATION, http://www.aryannation.org/RGB/WhoWhatWhyWhenWhereAryanNations.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). Their
“racial nation has a right and is under obligation to preserve itself and its members.” Id. Another
tenet is that “Adam-man of Genesis was the placing of the White Race upon this earth. All races did
not descend from Adam. Adam is the father of the White Race only.” Id. The Church is virulently
anti-Semitic, calling for “six million more” and claiming that Jews engage in human sacrifice.
ARYAN NATION, http://www.aryan-nation.org/zog/index.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
112. See Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that sincere religious desire
for Native American sweat lodge was substantially burdened, but nevertheless finding compelling
the prison’s administrative, security, and financial reasons for refusing to provide one); Cryer v.
Clarke, No. 09–10238–PBS, 2012 WL 6800791, *10 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2012) (“Court concludes
that defendants have established that prohibiting monthly access to a sweat lodge serves the
compelling interest of maintaining security and safety, and that they have further established that an
outright ban on access to sweat lodge ceremonies is the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest.”); Kempvanee v. Skolnik, No. 3:10–CV–00535–ECR–vVPC, 2012 WL 893901 (D. Nev.
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concerns. The most tangible and concrete objection brought by prison
administrators to accommodating religious belief and practice is cost. As
the State of Ohio explained in Cutter, “the upsurge in religious demands”
would strain resources and “make[] . . . employees unavailable for other
pressing tasks.”114 It remains unsettled whether cost alone constitutes a
compelling governmental interest sufficient to satisfy RLUIPA.115
Prison officials are also concerned about providing equal treatment and
avoiding the appearance of favoritism towards one group of prisoners. As
the State of Ohio explained in Cutter, “differences in treatment that outside
of prison would be understood as making a religious adherent whole, are
likely in prison to be perceived as favoritism and thus engender
resentment.”116
Additionally, prison officials worry about fakers. In Cutter, prison
officials argued that “[a]ffording religious prisoners rights superior to those
of nonreligious prisoners . . . might encourage prisoners to become religious
in order to enjoy greater rights.”117 If religious observance translates into
different and better food, less restricted environments for group worship, or
designated days of rest, then others may declare themselves members of the
religion solely to receive the perks.
Beyond the unfairness of gaining religious amenities without true
devotion, a secondary problem arises if the prison is put in the position of
determining whose beliefs are sincere. Prison officials have a credible
argument that such assessments risk violating the Establishment Clause by
entangling the government officials in the prisoners’ religion.

Mar. 14, 2012); but see Sousa v. Wegman, No. 1:11–CV–01754–MJS (PC), 2012 WL 2521115
(E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (referring to a sweat lodge in a California prison).
113. Orso v. Shumate, No. 3:10–cv–1069, 2010 WL 5698528, *6 (W.D. La. Oct. 13 2010)
(“[T]here exists a legitimate governmental interest in denying inmates access to burning incense.”).
114. Brief for Respondents at 18–19, Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (No. 03-9877) (citations omitted).
115. See Curry v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. C–09–3408 EMC (pr), 2013 WL 75769, *9 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 4, 2013) (“While there may be some question whether avoidance of a negligible cost
increase is a compelling state interest, the $50,000+ extra expense to provide the Kemetic diet for
one inmate is not a negligible cost increase.”).
116. Brief for Respondents at 15, Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (No. 03-9877) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Hearn v. Kennell, 433 Fed. App’x 483 (7th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting a claim by a Muslim prisoner—based on fact that Jewish prisoners received kosher meat
but Muslims had to eat vegetarian—because the prisoner offered no evidence of intentional
discrimination).
117. 544 U.S. at 718 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. Illegitimate Behavior and Motivation by Jailers
Although prison officials might have legitimate reasons to limit inmates’
religious exercise, there are some undoubtedly less admirable reasons they
might be inclined to do so. The power dynamics between jailers and the
jailed are an essential element of prison life. Prison administrators believe
that by wielding their authority they can provide a safe and orderly prison
environment. Showing keen awareness of such dynamics, the State of Ohio,
in Cutter, argued that any deference to prisoners’ religious needs would alter
the balance of power between jailers and inmates, and that religious inmates
would acquire “a powerful weapon to gain exemption from whatever prison
regulations they wish.”118 One judge in dissent complained that “akin to the
adage about ‘inmates running the asylum,’” the majority in reversing
summary judgment and allowing the prisoner pursue his claim under
RLUIPA permitted the “inmate to run the penitentiary.”119
In addition to establishing authority, the vast power of the warden can
spark cruel and authoritarian behavior. One recurring theme in the case law
of prisoners’ religious complaints is casual cruelty toward prisoners. These
cases demonstrate disrespect for inmates’ rights as human beings.
Why do the jailers behave so? Are they by nature sadistic people
attracted to the job of subjugating others? Perhaps certain personality types
are attracted to this type of work.120 Perhaps the work itself changes
people.121 Regarding religious exercise, perhaps the jailers do not want to
grant religious freedoms because to acknowledge religious rights is to
118. Brief for Respondents at 13, Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (No. 03-9877).
119. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t Crim. J., 703 F.3d 781, 798 (5th Cir. 2012) (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting in part).
120. There is a substantial literature indicating that corrections officers, particular the guards
who interact with prisoners, suffer from high stress. See Sunny Schwartz & Leslie Levitas, A New
Vision for Correctional Officers, 27 TIKKUN 37 (2012).
121. In 1973, Philip G. Zimbardo, a social psychologist, designed an experiment in which he
randomly assigned twenty-four mentally healthy male college students to be either prisoners or
guards. Philip G. Zimbardo et al., Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis,
Transformations, Consequences, in OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE
MILGRAM PARADIGM 193–237 (T. Blass ed., 2000), available at http://www.prisonexp.org/
pdf/blass.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). In a short time the prisoners became pathologically passive,
depressed and stressed, and the guards aggressive and sadistic. Id. The experiment, designed to last
two weeks, was terminated after six days because “because too many normal young men were
behaving pathologically as powerless prisoners or as sadistic, all-powerful guards.” Id.; see also
TED CONOVER, NEWJACK: GUARDING SING SING (2000) (recounting an undercover journalist’s
yearlong work at Sing Sing and portraying the hardships and moral ambiguities of the job.).
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acknowledge the prisoners’ basic humanity and equality. It is emotionally
easier for prison workers to deal harshly and dismissively with prisoners if
one conceives of them as caged animals rather than fully equal human
beings.122 Conversely, respect for prisoners’ religions and their status as
people of faith humanizes the incarcerated. For some, relating to prisoners
as fellow worshippers, equal in the eyes of their mutual creator, seems to
subvert the strict prison hierarchy.
Not surprisingly, many of the most troubling cases concerning religious
practices in prison involve mistreatment of Muslims. In Williams v. Bitner,
a Muslim prisoner was fired from his job as a jail kitchen worker for
refusing to handle pork.123 Based on his refusal, which was grounded in
sincere religious belief, he was cited for misconduct and served twentyseven days in cell restriction punishment for insubordination.124
Consequently, he missed religious observances, including the annual Islamic
festival of Eid-al-Fitr at the end of Ramadan.125 At the conclusion of his cell
restriction, Williams was reassigned to serve as a janitor in the kitchen, a
position that—at nineteen cents per hour—provided half the compensation
of his previous job as a cook.126 The prison staff also placed the misconduct
citation in Williams’s institutional disciplinary record and raised his security
classification from “low” to “medium.”127
In Lovelace v. Lee, an inmate, who complained about being served
expired milk, was taken off the Ramadan list because a guard claimed that
he saw the prisoner eating during Ramadan—a holy month during which
observant Muslims fast during daylight hours.128 The facts as described by
the appellate court make it seem likely that the guard’s assertion was
dishonest and retributory, but by the time the case came to trial the prisoner
had long-since faced the choice of either breaking Ramadan by eating the

122. Here it is worth quoting Justice Brennan’s dissent in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: “It is
thus easy to think of prisoners as members of a separate netherworld, driven by its own demands,
ordered by its own customs, ruled by those whose claim to power rests on raw necessity.” 482 U.S.
342, 355 (1987).
123. Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).
124. Id. at 188–89.
125. Id. at 189. He also missed his Arabic Studies classes, which prevented him from obtaining
his certification in that subject. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 472 F.3d 174, 184–85 (4th Cir. 2006).
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regular meals during the day or starving.129
In a case that similarly seems to involve indifference or cruelty, Jewish
inmates were not provided with sack dinners after fasting for Yom Kippur.130
The prison administrators thereby extended a twenty-five hour fast to a
thirty-six hour fast, wherein the Jewish prisoners received no food until the
morning.131
Other cases bespeak ignorance and adherence to religious orthodoxy. In
Pittman-Bey v. Clay, the plaintiff was forbidden from receiving his postsunset meal during Ramadan because he failed to attend Friday prayers.132
As he attempted to explain to the prison authorities with no success,
members of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, such as Pittman-Bey, are
forbidden from attending Friday prayers while in jail.133 The court allowed
the case to go forward on RLUIPA and under the First Amendment.134 The
court described the Ramadan meal as “an essential part of the Ramadan
experience.”135 It is unclear, however, whether the court understood that by
forgoing this experience the prisoner would starve.
Some cases involving Jewish inmates’ requests for religious
accommodation also include significant evidence of discriminatory
treatment, retaliation, and anti-Semitism. For instance, Jewish prisoners
receiving special kosher diets in the Groveland Correctional Facility in New
York alleged that the prison administration segregated them at meal times by
compelling them to sit at a table designated as “Jewish Inmates Only,” and
that prison officials threatened disciplinary sanctions if they refused to sit
there.136 Another court rejected summary judgment, finding that the prison
had created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether taking the prisoner
off the kosher-diet list because the prisoner took a protein powder
supplement was motivated by an attempt to retaliate against the prisoner for
129. Id. at 195–96. The guard refused to sign an affidavit and no one at the prison would review
the video of the cafeteria, which would have proven without question whether the prisoner had taken
lunch as the guard asserted. Id. at 184, 195.
130. Brown v. Vail, No. CV–08–5091–JPH, 2009 WL 2253334, at *3–5 (E.D. Wash. July 28,
2009).
131. Id.
132. Pittman-Bey v. Clay, No. V–10–086, 2011 WL 6749027, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2011).
133. Id. at *1–2; see Mohammad Akhtar Raza Kahn Qadiri Azhari, Jumah in Prison, AZHARUL
FATAWA, http://www.taajushshariah.com/Fatawa/jumma_prison.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
134. Pittman-Bey, 2011 WL 6749027, at *1.
135. Id. at *6.
136. Ward v. Rabideau, 732 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
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filing too many grievances.137
3. Prisoners Behaving Badly
If some aspects of religious exercise in prison reveal the casual cruelty
of jailers, then another theme involves prisoners who are clearly gaming the
system or complaining over insubstantial or unreasonable matters. For
instance, a Texas prisoner, who illegitimately refused to go to another unit
for his requested eye exam did not raise a valid RLUIPA claim when he
challenged the disciplinary action preventing him from attending outside
events (including a celebration of the end of Ramadan) for breaking the
appointment.138 In Miller v. Wilkinson, a prisoner complained under
RLUIPA of the prison’s failure to acknowledge his common-law name
change. 139 The prisoner, who prefers the name Alfar Kynwolf, argued that
his religious exercise was burdened because he was “forced to ‘use names
imposed on my ancestors by Christians by force in the 9th and 10th
centuries’ and that the use of his Asatru name [would] allow[] him to form a
religious connection with his ancestors and his sacred animal, the wolf.”140
The court was skeptical whether a substantial burden existed upon his
religion (particularly because his old name would have been retained in the
137. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). Another aspect of the dehumanization of
prisoners stems from their portrayal as whiners with trivial problems, too much free time on their
hands, and easy access to courts. Fred Cohen, The Limits of the Judicial Reform of Prisons: What
Works; What Does Not, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 421, 447 (2004). One good example is a list from the
National Association of Attorneys General enumerating their top-ten frivolous lawsuits. Id. at 449.
Some items on the list were truly frivolous—such as a nudist inmate claiming his free exercise right
to have his girlfriend visit in see-through clothing. Id. Most items on the top-ten list, patterned after
the comic presentations of David Letterman, however, sadly mock untreated mental illness. Id. For
example, one item on the list derides a prisoner who claimed that the prison minister was “reading
his letters to God and incorporating the material in his sermons.” Id. Another item in what
ostensibly is a litany of frivolous suits seemed reasonable. Id. It concerned a prisoner suing because
the prison’s new telephone system made it expensive for family and friends to receive collect calls.
Id. Prisoners are required to call collect; the prices are much higher than normal collect calls and the
prisons split the profits with the phone carriers. See Families of Prisoners Paying High Price for
Collect Calls, NPR, (Dec. 21, 2004, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=4238743. Some prisoners are thus effectively prevented from maintaining
outside contact with their loved ones.
138. Mitchell v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, No. 1:11–CV–045–BLECF, 2011 WL 6029884,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2011) (holding that this claim and all the prisoner’s other claims “should be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS”) (emphasis in original).
139. No. 2:98–cv–275, 2010 WL 3909119, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2010).
140. Id. at *10.
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prison records even if his new name were formally added as an “aka”).141
The court also credited the important administrative concerns of having the
same name follow a prisoner.142 As a final example, a prisoner, with a
history of violence against correction officers, could not make a successful
RLUIPA claim based on the prison’s refusal to have the chaplain provide
individual foot washing, because under the tenets of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church, the prisoner could perform this ritual himself.143
IV. RELIGIOUS EXERCISE QUESTIONS RAISED BY PASSOVER OBSERVANCE
IN PRISON
All prisons have specific rules about food, and many have detailed rules
about kosher food and even kosher-for-Passover food.144 Prison regulations
can be applied woodenly, and inmates who reject food as insufficiently
141. Id. at *11.
142. Id. at *12. But cf. Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying the
First Amendment, not RLUIPA, court held that the prison policy, which refused to use a dual-name
policy, violated the free exercise rights of inmate, who had legally changed his name).
143. See Wakefield v. Indermill, No. 1:09–cv–00274–LJO–BAM PC, 2011 WL 5876246, at *10
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011).
144. For instance, in addition to specifying a staggering number of medical diets for, among
other things, hypertension, diabetes, dental soft diet, pregnancy, and gluten intolerance, the State of
Arizona makes special provision for religious diets, including a lacto vegetarian diet and a kosher
diet. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DIET REFERENCE MANUAL (2008), available at
http://www.azcorrections.gov/hlthsvc_rfp/diet_ref_manual_may2008.pdf. The regulations specify
that “[k]osher Passover meals will be provided for all inmates on the kosher diet during Passover.”
Id. at 13; See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3054.2 (2010) (“requiring kosher for Passover foods to
be provided during the eight days of observance”); 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 471.09(5)(b) (2013)
(“Where religious holidays specify particular dietary requirements (e.g., Passover, month of
Ramadan), special arrangements should be made so that inmates shall be able to adhere to their
religious beliefs.”); MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE, No. 05.03.150, at 7 (effective Mar.
20, 2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_150_330459_7.pdf
(“Pursuant to court order, an annual Passover Seder shall be conducted . . . . Only prisoners who
designated Judaism as their religious affiliation shall be permitted to attend the Seder.”); OHIO DEP’T
REHAB. & CORR., JEWISH RELIGIOUS SERVICES, No. 72-REG-07, at 2 (effective Jan. 25, 2009),
available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/72-REG-07.pdf (“Passover—An
eight-day observance commemorating the exodus from Egypt. Leavened materials are removed and
‘Kosher for Passover’ requirements are added to the diet. Kosher for Passover meals differ from
regular kosher meals.”); VA. DEP’T OF CORR., MASTER RELIGIOUS CALENDAR, OPERATING
PROCEDURE 841.3, at 1 (effective Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/about/
procedures/documents/800/841-3_A2.pdf (providing matzo in place of bread and a ceremonial
Passover Seder plate, and noting that “The Passover Seder meal is itself a worship time. At least two
hours should be allowed (for saying prayers, reading scriptures, singing hymns, etc.). Service should
begin 30 minutes after sundown.”).
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compliant with the kosher rules risk being barred from access to kosher
meals entirely.145
Seders and kosher-for-Passover food in prison raise First Amendment
issues about religious exercise and serve as a vehicle for exploring how such
rights are tempered by concerns about equal treatment of all prisoners, as
well as jailers’ administrative needs and safety concerns. The request for a
Seder or for matzah and other kosher-for-Passover items raises interesting
legal questions that display the complexity—and sometimes the harshness
and arbitrariness—of prison regulations. They also illustrate disagreement
regarding the degree to which the warden-as-Pharaoh must accommodate
Jewish religious practices, and how those accommodations must be balanced
against prison safety and orderly administration. The approximately sixty
cases that deal with Passover celebration in prison also expose the thorny
issues of who qualifies as a Jew. Because kosher-for-Passover meals are
generally higher quality than regular prison fare, the prison must decide who
is genuinely eligible and who is claiming the religious diets under false
pretenses.146
In Whitney v. Brown, a pre-RLUIPA case analyzing the question of
prisoners having a Seder, Jewish prisoners at the State Prison of Southern
Michigan brought a § 1983 suit challenging a prison policy that prohibited
them from congregating in weekly Sabbath services and an annual Passover
Seder.147 The court was critical of the prison’s justifications for rejecting the
Passover Seder, noting that this annual event had caused no security
145. Willis v. Commissioner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 768, 770 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (recounting prisoner’s
contention that he was “deprived [of] his religious meal card after failing to eat at least 75 percent of
his [kosher] meals”).
146. Those readers who have actually tasted kosher-for-Passover food might marvel that
someone would try to manipulate the prison system to get it. But as Rabbi Levi Klein, a chaplain in
various Southern prisons, explains, even the kosher-for-Passover dinners are appetizing to prisoners
who have the same daily prison diet. Melvin, supra note 32. According to Klein, the meals are
tempting enough to foster conversion. Id. During the Passover season, the number of inmates
wanting to affiliate with Judaism skyrockets and Klein must discern real Jews from “Gastro Jews.”
Id. When Klein asked why certain prisoners wanted to learn more about Judaism, the less spiritually
motivated inmates would answer, “My friend told me you get grape juice.” Id.
147. Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1989). See generally 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2012) (civil action for deprivation of rights). Below, the district court had permitted the
annual Seder, but not the weekly Sabbath services, and both sides appealed. Whitney, 882 F.2d at
1069. Although technically a Seder does not require a prayer quorum, “because the Passover Seder
is a celebration of the exodus of the Jewish people out of Egypt, an individual’s solo Seder, or one
conducted with only a very few worshipers, was characterized below as ‘a very miserable seder.’”
Id. at 1070.
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problems and that the prisoners had been flexible in moving the location and
providing their own catered meals.148 It discredited the prison’s argument
that “any time the normal routine of an institution is altered, the good order
and security of that facility are potentially compromised,” and held that the
additional cost of moving prisoners within the facility was de minimis.149
A. Kosher-for-Passover Food
1. Kosher Food Generally
The designation “kosher” affects not only which foods an observant Jew
can eat,150 but also permissible food combinations,151 how the animals are
slaughtered,152 how the utensils are used in preparation and eating,153 and

148. Whitney, 882 F.2d at 1075.
149. Id. at 1074 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. For instance, the biblical rules of keeping kosher enjoin eating “abominable things,”
including pork, shellfish, snakes, rabbits, and camels, to name a few. See Leviticus 11; see also
Deuteronomy 14:2–21.
151. Part of keeping kosher requires maintaining a separation of milk and meat, which includes
chicken but not fish. The prohibition derives from the Biblical injunction against boiling a calf in its
mother’s milk. See Exodus 23:19, 34:26; see also Deuteronomy 12:21. This has been extrapolated
to ban a turkey and cheese sandwich. See Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws, MECHON MAMRE,
http://www.mechon-mamre.org/jewfaq/kashrut.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). There is also an
intermediate category called “pareve,” which is neither dairy nor meat (such as fish, grains, eggs,
vegetables, and fruit) and can be consumed with either dairy or meat. Id.
152. See JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO KNOW
ABOUT THE JEWISH RELIGION, ITS PEOPLE, AND ITS HISTORY 712 (rev. ed. 2008).
153. See Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws, supra note 151 (“Utensils (pots, pans, plates, flatware,
etc., etc.) must also be kosher. A utensil picks up the kosher ‘status’ (meat, dairy, pareve, or treyf
[non-kosher]) of the food that is cooked in it or eaten off of it, and transmits that status back to the
next food that is cooked in it or eaten off of it.”). As one court recently explained:
The laws of kosher address a comprehensive dietary system—including not only the
types of foods that may be eaten, but also the preparation requirements, which ensure
kosher ingredients are not “contaminated” by non-kosher ingredients. . . . According to
the laws of kosher, dairy and meat, both of which must be kosher in their core
ingredients, must be totally separated during preparation and consumption; they may
neither be served at the same meal nor mixed with plates/utensils that have touched the
other category of food. . . . Although the laws of kosher are traditionally complicated, one
fundamental tenet is non-contamination of kosher food products with non-kosher
products during and after preparation—as such, kosher food must be carefully supervised
through the phases of production.
Willis v. Commissioner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (citations omitted).
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even which sponges are used for the cleanup.154 Because of all these
strictures, kosher food—and particularly kosher meat—is expensive. One
prison administrator explained the costs involved:
Providing kosher meals requires extra effort and extra expense.
Separate Kosher kitchens are maintained at selected prison sites. It
is expensive to build and equip a Koher [sic] kitchen. . . . [I]n
addition to the logistical requirements of keeping a kosher kitchen,
Kosher meals cost two to three times as much as meals from the
main food line.155
Any deviation from the general menu plan is bound to add costs. As
another prison administrator explained, “special diets require additional
accountability and planning, more preparation manpower, and at times, more
expensive ingredient costs.”156 Kosher food is particularly expensive.
Interestingly, one cause of the increased cost of kosher meals in some
prisons is the request by devout Muslims for kosher foods, which satisfy the
Muslim requirements of halal.157
154. Willis v. Commissioner, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 773; see also Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Jewish dietary laws, ‘kashrut,’ are fundamental
to the practice of Judaism as embodied in the Torah and Rabbinic laws. Food that satisfies the
biblical and rabbinic requirements is deemed ‘kosher.’ Those laws demand that food be stored,
prepared, and served in a certain manner, and they exclude certain types of food. For example, pork
is per se nonkosher. Food that would otherwise be kosher becomes nonkosher if mixed with
nonkosher food or brought into contact with utensils that have been used in the preparation of
nonkosher food. For that reason, certain types of food must not be served, and a separate set of
cookware, utensils, and flatware must generally be used.”).
155. DuJardine v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-701, 2008 WL 4146021, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Aug. 4, 2008) (quoting Affidavit of Michigan Department of Corrections Special Activities
Coordinator Dave J. Burnett); see also Andreola v. Wisconsin, 211 F. App’x 495, 496 (7th Cir.
2006) (noting that certified kosher meals cost “nearly four times the cost of non-kosher meals”). In
Curry v. California Department of Corrections, No. C–09–3408 EMC (pr), 2013 WL 75769 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 4, 2013), the court rejected a prisoner’s request based on his Neterian religion for a
Kemetic (vegan, non-wheat, non-GMO) diet. It noted the various medical and religious diets
already available in the California system: “$2.82 for the standard diet; $3.20 for the vegetarian diet;
$3.50 for the religious-meat-alternate diet; $9.28 for the Jewish-kosher diet; and approximately
$26.03 for the Kemetic diet requested.” Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
156. Isbell v. Ryan, No. CV 11–0391–PHX–JAT (JFM), 2011 WL 6050337, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 6, 2011) (citations omitted).
157. “‘Halal . . . literally means ‘lawful or permitted.’ For meat to be halal, it cannot be of
certain types or parts of animals and must be butchered in a certain manner [with a
blessing] . . . . The Quran specifically allows . . . [beef], camels, sheep, goat, seafood, and
‘that which you have taught birds and beasts of prey to catch, training them as God has
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Jews comprise a small percent of those incarcerated and archival
evidence indicates that provision of kosher food to Jewish inmates dates as
far back as the 1850s.158 Twenty-six out of thirty-four states responding to a
survey indicated that they provide kosher food to prisoners.159 Those that do
not offer vegan or vegetarian meals instead.160 Most federal circuit courts
require prisons to provide kosher food to Jews who request it;161 others do
taught you.’”
Rain Levy Minns, Food Fights: Redefining the Current Boundaries of the Government’s Positive
Obligation to Provide Halal, 17 J.L. & POL. 713, 717–18 (2001); Willis, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 772
(observing that “in the past few years, the number of kosher meals increased, in large part due to
Muslim inmates who did not have access to Halal meals but found sufficient substitutes in kosher
meals” (citations omitted)). Not all Muslims are entitled to kosher meals. See Sims v. Wegman, No.
1:11cv0931 DLB PC, 2011 WL 6367750, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2011) (denying Muslim
prisoner’s request for kosher meals, which comport with halal requirements and would allow
prisoners to eat meat, because the prison regulations provide that “Jewish Kosher Diet Program is
only available to Jewish inmates and plaintiff” had no affirmative religious interest in eating meat);
Williams v. Dart, No. 10 C 2499, 2011 WL 4808167, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2011) (“Williams also
requested a Kosher diet, which like an Islamic diet is pork-free, but that request was denied because
Williams is not Jewish.”). Similarly, in New Jersey one can only receive vegetarian meals.
Unpublished Statement of Sylvia Orenstein, public defender of Marco Bey (on file with the author).
To get kosher meals in New Jersey, a person has to list his religion as Jewish, and then cannot attend
Muslim services. Id.
158. See Gary Friedman, Rewriting Leviticus, AMERICAN JAILS 17, 18 (July, Aug. 2012),
available at http://jpsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/americanjails-julyaugust.pdf.
159. See Brandon Sample, Maryland Prisoners Receive Kosher Food, PRISON LEGAL NEWS,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/displayArticle.aspx?articleid=21655&AspxAutoDetectCookieSup
port=1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). As of this writing, Florida recently reinstated its kosher food
program in response to a suit by the United State Department of Justice. See Steve Bousquet, Justice
Department Sues Florida over Lack of Kosher Meals for Prison Inmates, TAMPA BAY TIMES, (Aug.
16, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/legislature/justice-department-sues-florida-overlack-of-kosher-meals-for-prison/1246207. Nevada has hired a kosher consultant as part of
settlement of a class action lawsuit by an Orthodox Jewish prisoner who found the common fare
unsuitable for his level of kosher observance because of shellfish and mixture of milk and meat. See
Cy Ryan, Nevada Moving to Settle Lawsuit over Kosher Prison Meals, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sept. 17,
2012,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/sep/17/nevada-moving-settle-lawsuit-over-kosherprison-me/; see also JTA, Nevada Moves to Provide Kosher Food for Inmates, JEWISH DAILY
FORWARD, Sept. 19, 2012, http://forward.com/articles/163038/nevada-moves-to-provide-kosherfood-for-inmates/.
160. JTA, Nevada Moves to Provide Kosher Food for Inmates, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Sept.
19, 2012, http://forward.com/articles/163038/nevada-moves-to-provide-kosher-food-for-inmates/.
161. The Sixth Circuit required the provision of kosher meals to those who hold sincere
religious beliefs. See Bonnell v. Burnett, No. 07–CV–15444, 2011 WL 4533830, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 29, 2011) (“[T]here is no compelling state interest to deny a kosher meal to a prisoner whose
religious beliefs regarding the meal are sincerely held.” (citations omitted)); see also Kretchmar v.
Beard, 241 F. App’x 863, 865 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that inmate’s religious exercise was not
substantially burdened by his regularly receiving cold, not hot kosher meals that were nutritionally
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not.162 According to one estimate only a sixth of the 24,000 inmates, who
receive kosher food in prison, are traditionally considered Jewish.163 In
Baranowski v. Hart, however, the Fifth Circuit found that although failure to
provide kosher meals to a Jewish inmate might substantially burden his
religious exercise, the State of Texas had a compelling governmental interest
in maintaining good order and controlling costs.164
There were
approximately 165 practicing Jewish inmates in the prison, which had a total
population of 145,000.165 Providing kosher meals cost the prison twelve to
fifteen dollars per day, while non-kosher meals cost an average of only
$2.46 per day.166 Since then, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice has
created a single kosher unit meant to accommodate all but the most violent
offenders housed near a large Jewish community.167 Excluding start-up
expenses, the cost of feeding a prisoner at the kosher kitchen was $6.82 per
day, as opposed to $3.82 for a normal prison diet.168 Kosher food is
available for purchase at other Texas prisons, but the Fifth Circuit has
indicated that making an inmate pay for his kosher food places a substantial

adequate).
162. See Berryman v. Granholm, No. 06-CV-11010-DT, 2007 WL 2259334, *3 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 3, 2007) (holding that “temporary suspension of the kosher meal program did [not] constitute a
substantial burden” and prison officials “ha[d] a compelling financial interest in ensuring that kosher
food is served only to those inmates who sincerely need it for religious reasons”). But see Madison
v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 569 n.2 (W.D. Va. 2003) (finding that inmate met “the substantial
burden threshold under RLUIPA” when he was denied a kosher meal request).
163. Naomi Zeveloff, Not Just Jews Eat Kosher Food in Prison: Millions Spent on Special
Meals
for
Non-Jewish
Inmates,
JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Apr.
30,
2012,
http://forward.com/articles/155363/not-just-jews-eat-kosher-food-in-prison/?p=all#ixzz2Iim5TRHh;
see David Z. Bernstein, Why Prisoners Love Kosher Food, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan. 2, 2013, 5:20
PM), http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/why-prisoners-love-kosher-food (“[T]he majority of inmates
who receive kosher food in the United States are not religious Jews. There are the Messianic Jews,
secular Jews, Black Hebrew Israelites and in most cases non-Jews, who also receive this privilege.
In fact Jews make up only one sixth of inmates who eat kosher food in American jails.”); see also
Friedman, supra note 158 at 18 (discussing the “kosher diet craze that is rapidly escalating among
inmates”).
164. 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1062 (2007).
165. Id. at 117.
166. Id. at 118.
167. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 787 (5th Cir. 2012). See
Ronald G. Turner, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 45 TENN. B.J.
25 (2009).
168. Id.; see also Yaacov v. Collins, 649 F. Supp2d. 679 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (noting that “[p]repackaged Kosher meals at the prison cost $7.00 per meal as opposed to $0.80 per main-line meal”).
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burden on his religious exercise.169
The State of Florida had eliminated kosher food in its prisons in August
2007, citing cost and equal treatment concerns.170 Additionally, gang
members, in order to stay together in the same facility, all requested kosher
food (which led them to the prison with the kosher kitchen).171 This
presented safety concerns when corrections officers wished to split up gang
members among various facilities.172 In 2012, the Justice Department
brought suit against Florida while several cases were pending in the
Eleventh Circuit.173
Even if the cost of kosher food qualifies as a compelling governmental
interest, that interest must, according to RLUIPA, be narrowly tailored. In
one case, the administration informed the prisoner that he could keep kosher,
but would have to be transferred to a maximum-security facility where there
were other Jews, who kept kosher, and where there could be economy of
scale.174 The court held that the prison failed to find the least restrictive
means to grant the prisoner his religious exercise.175
Because kosher meals are generally of higher quality than regular prison
fare, prison officials worry about culinary conversions.176 The prison must
decide who is genuinely eligible and who is requesting it just to eat tastier
food. As one prison administrator explained, “extra effort and expense
should be reserved only for those for whom the meals are a religious
requirement, and who demonstrate that they have enough knowledge to
enable them to abide by the requirements of their faith.”177
169. Id. at 793–94.
170. News Serv. of Fla., Feds Sue Florida Prisons Over Kosher Meals, (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.northescambia.com/2012/08/feds-sue-florida-prisons-over-kosher-meals.
171. Robert, Feds Sue Florida Prisons Over Kosher Meals, (Aug. 19, 2012, 7:46 AM),
http://www.northescambia.com/2012/08/feds-sue-florida-prisons-over-kosher-meals.
172. Id. (“[G]ang members were changing their religions to Jewish, so they would be transferred
t[o] one of the few prisons that has a kosher kitchen. They would then be housed with their gang
partners.”).
173. News Serv. of Fla., Feds Sue Florida Prisons Over Kosher Meals, (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.northescambia.com/2012/08/feds-sue-florida-prisons-over-kosher-meals.
174. Shilling v. Crawford, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Nev. 2008).
175. Id. at 1234.
176. Among the reasons that non-Jews request kosher food include test, safety, and the fact that
kosher food often comes prepackaged, which makes it easier to trade or sell. See Zeveloff, supra
note 163.
177. DuJardine v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-701, 2008 WL 4146021, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
2008) (quoting Affidavit of Michigan Department of Corrections Special Activities Coordinator
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This requires prison administrators to determine who is sincere in their
religious belief178 and sometimes raises painful and difficult questions about
who qualifies as a Jew. One group, Messianic Jews (also known as Jews for
Jesus), often demands Jewish services but is rejected by the other Jews in
prison as inauthentic.179 In Ohio, a group of Messianic Jewish inmates filed
suit after being denied kosher meals by prison officials who classified them
as Protestants.180 The inmates were provided with kosher meals on Jewish
holidays but received cheaper, non-kosher meals otherwise.181
Even when a prisoner is unquestionably Jewish, the issue of sincerity
arises.182 RLUIPA does not apply to mere food preferences, but to
religiously mandated ones that arise from the prisoner’s sincere religious
beliefs.183 Therefore, the prisons are in the business of investigating those
beliefs and the prison chaplain “can review the request in light of the
inmate’s inconsistent history and behavior, which may include an
investigation into such factors as past religious declarations, disciplinary
history, and discretionary food purchases that are inconsistent with the
requested diet.”184 Where the prisoner obtains non-kosher food from the
Dave J. Burnett) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 2012)
(“Sincerity of a belief is an essential initial matter in a RLUIPA claim.”); Sossamon v. Texas, 560
F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) (The inmate must possess “an honest belief that the practice is
important to his free exercise of religion.”).
179. See, e.g., Prisoner Services, ALEPH INST., http://www.aleph-institute.org/prisonerservices.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (listing one of its missions as: “[l]obby to prevent Messianic
‘rabbis’ conducting Jewish services”). Meredith Heagney, Messianic Jewish Inmates Claim
Discrimination; Ohio Prisons Label Them Protestants, Deny Them More-Costly Kosher Meals,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 18, 2008, at 03B; see also Glenn Harris, Passover in Prison, JEWS FOR
JESUS 4 (Mar. 31, 1996), http://jewsforjesus.org/pdf/newsletter/newsletter-1996-04.pdf (describing a
Passover Celebration led by a Jews for Jesus chaplain). Other religious groups may specifically
require kosher food. See, e.g., Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 2008) (The prison
denied kosher food by a practitioner of “the Assemblies of Yahweh, a Christian sect which requires
its members to follow Old Testament law.”); Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 127 (4th Cir. 2006)
(involving a request for kosher food by “a Hebrew Israelite and member of the Church of God and
Saints of Christ”).
180. Heagney, supra note 179, at 03B.
181. Id.
182. Supra note 178
183. Moussazadeh, supra note 178.
184. Isbell v. Ryan, No. CV 11–0391–PHX–JAT (JFM), 2011 WL 6050337, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 6, 2011) (citations omitted) (finding a genuine question of material fact whether prisoner’s
request for a lacto-vegetarian diet to follow Asatru, an ancient northern European religion, where he
sincerely felt he could not eat meat unless he knew how it was slaughtered).
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commissary, he has waived the right to ask for kosher food.185 This
sometimes takes the form of “the cheeseburger test.”186 For instance, one
case describes a prisoner’s mandatory “religious diet interview” with the
prison chaplain.187 The prisoner’s response when asked to explain the major
teaching of Judaism was “following God’s laws,” noting there were
“hundreds of them.”188 The prisoner could only identity one Jewish
holiday.189 This, and his other inadequate replies, prohibited him from
getting kosher food, even though he was serious about his faith.190 Ross
Lawson was denied kosher food because the court found that although
Lawson claimed to be an Orthodox Jew (thereby requiring him to keep
Kosher as well as refrain from working on the Sabbath), he “never attends
morning Jewish prayer services, has declined a proffered work release, and
eats non-Kosher foods.”191 Some opinions list the non-kosher items prisoner

185. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE, No. 05.03.150, at 7 (effective Mar.
20, 2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_150_330459_7.pdf
(“A prisoner approved to eat from a religious menu shall have that approval rescinded if s/he eats, or
has in his/her possession, any food item that violates a tenet of his/her designated religion.”).
186. See, e.g., Horacek v. Burnett, No. 07-11885, 2008 WL 4427825, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
19, 2008). All cheeseburgers are nonkosher because they mingle dairy with beef, a combination
prohibited by the kosher laws. Tracey R. Rich, Judaism 101: Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws,
http://www.jewfaq.org/kashrut.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). In addition, a cheeseburger from the
commissary would be nonkosher because it has nonkosher meat.
187. See DuJardine v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-701, 2008 WL 4146021, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. 2008) (“[P]laintiff underwent a religious diet interview” “pursuant to Policy Directive
05.03.150 and Operating Procedure 05.03.150A”); see also Schuh v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No.
1:09–CV–982, 2011 WL 4529641, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2011) (noting that chaplain found
prisoner “lacked a genuine understanding” of Judaism and holding that plaintiff’s current receipt of
kosher food rendered the year-long denial moot); Allison v. Martin, No. 08–15093–BC, 2011 WL
6217425, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2011). In Allison, a new convert to Judaism was denied kosher
food because he failed the “Kosher diet test” by providing “brief, incomplete and sometimes
inaccurate explanations to the questions asked” and being “unable to explain the major teachings of
Judaism or what a kosher diet does and does not consist of.” Allison, 2011 WL 6217425, at *1. The
lack of knowledge and an attempt to cheat on the test suggested a lack of sincerity on the part of the
prisoner. Schuh, 2011 WL 4529641, at *1.
188. See Schuh, 2011 WL 4529641, at *1 (internal citations omitted).
189. See id. (The plaintiff noted Passover in this case.).
190. Id.
191. Lawson v. Aleph Inst., No. 4:04-cv-00105, 2009 WL 4404720, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 2,
2009) (“Sworn testimony that Plaintiff has purchased and eaten non-Kosher foods such as
cheeseburgers undermines his claim of sincere Jewish Orthodoxy.”), rev’d on other grounds,
Lawson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 454 Fed. App’x 706 (11th Cir. 2011). In another context a court
portrayed it as “the Plaintiff was accused of having been in possession of a cheeseburger.” Horacek
v. Burnett, No. 07-11885, 2008 WL 4427825, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2008).
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have purchased at the prison commissary.192 Such inquiries into practice and
knowledge are conducted for all religious diets.193
In Horacek v. Burnett, the test seemed grossly unfair.194 The court
refused to grant summary judgment against a prisoner who was denied
kosher food, despite having passed the “Kosher Meal Program participation
test.”195 The prison administration denied his request, because as a
reoffending parole violator, “his continuing criminal behavior reflected a
lack of sincerity about practicing Judaism, which does not advocate
crime.”196 In response, the court observed: “What religion does advocate
crime? And what prison inmate has not been convicted of one or several
crimes? The reductio ad absurdum of Defendant’s reasoning would be the
denial of all religious practices to all inmates, or at least to all recidivist
inmates.”197
In addition to reasons of cost and concerns about establishment of
religion, questions arise about safety. Where only a few people get special
meals, issues of safety and worries about food tampering arise.198 More
importantly, prison administrators are concerned about equal protection and
the appearance of unequal treatment.199 If Jews are accommodated, then
Muslims requesting halal meat and Buddhists requesting vegan diets must
also receive special meals.200 One administrative response to Muslim
192. See, e.g., Lute v. Johnson, 2012 WL 913749 *6 (D. Idaho) (“Plaintiff has consistently
purchased nonkosher food from the prison commissary, including rice noodles, nacho chips, salsa,
corn tortillas, chili, beef stew, barbeque beef, roast beef and gravy, chili ramen noodles, beef ramen
noodles, enchilada party mix, instant milk, and hot summer sausage.”); Mahone v. Pierce County,
2011 WL 2360354 *2 (W.D. Wash.) (listing “jalapeno cheese, sharp cheddar cheese, Ramen–Texas
beef, Ramen Hot and Spicy Vegetable, and Ramen Chili”).
193. See Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 2012).
194. No. 07-11885, 2008 WL 4427825, at *1.
195. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. at *2 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at *6.
198. See El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2010). “El-Tabech discovered feces
wrapped in plastic in a vegan entree prepared and delivered by TSCI staff.” Id. at 843.
199. See, e.g., Turner-Bey v. Maynard, No. Civ.A. JFM–10–2816, 2012 WL 4327282, at *3 (D.
Md. Sept. 18, 2012) (“Prison officials must craft such diets in order to eliminate perceptions of
favoritism which could pose legitimate security concerns.”).
200. See DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2004). The Buddhist prisoner, for religious
reasons, ate “only fruit, certain cereals, salads when served without dressing, and vegetables served
with margarine.” Id. at 265. He “supplement[ed] his meals with items purchased from the
commissary, including peanut butter, peanuts, pretzels, potato chips, caramel popcorn, and trail
mix,” and “request[ed] that the Prison provide him with a diet free of meat, dairy products and
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concerns about the availability of kosher food, but not halal, was to provide
a pork-free diet with a lacto-ovo-vegetarian option.201
2. Special Challenges of Kosher-for-Passover Food
One important issue surrounding kosher-for-Passover food in prison is
the cost and difficulty of preparing the special diet.202 Benson Li, the
sheriff’s department manager for food service units in the Los Angeles jail,
stated that the “kosher for Passover food costs $24.30 per inmate per day.
‘That’s almost nine times more than the regular meals,’ [he] said, referring
to [the] nonkosher food that most of the 15,000 other inmates eat daily.”203
In Cook County, Illinois (as in many jails) the kosher food is donated by
outside sources.204 The donations undermine the governmental objections as
to cost, but some prisons prohibit food being brought in from the outside for
security and fairness reasons.205
In Sokolsky v. Voss, despite timely and repeated requests, the prisoner
received kosher—but not kosher-for-Passover—food.206 In what can only be
pungent vegetables.” Id.
201. Turner-Bey, 2012 WL 4327282, at *3 n.19.
202. “Rabbi Lon Moskowitz, who has served as the Jewish chaplain at the California Men’s
Colony in San Luis Obispo for the past fifteen years,” stated of Passover: “‘I think it’s the most
intensive Jewish holy day inside the prison system, just because it is so logistically complicated.’”
Jonah
Lowenfeld,
Passover
in
Prison,
JEWISH JOURNAL (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.jewishjournal.com/passover/article/this_matzah_is_kept_under_lock_and_key_so_are_t
he_people_who_will_eat_it_/.
203. Id.
204. Dawn Rhodes, Passover Celebrations Parallel Story Behind Holiday, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 17,
2011), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-04-17/news/ct-met-passover-prison20110417_1_kosher-meals-jewish-inmates-passover-prayers (“Because of strict guidelines on how
to prepare food for Passover, none of it can be prepared in the jail’s vast kitchen facilities, which
churn out about 30,000 meals daily, officials said. Instead, Rabbi Binyomin Scheiman delivered an
eight-day supply of kosher fare and instructed jail authorities on what to serve when.”). The Aleph
Institute, an arm of Chabad that ministers to Jews in prison and in the military, provides the
following for the Seder: “Matzah, shmura (handmade [and specially watched to make sure no
leavening agent is introduced]) matzah, grape juice, horseradish, gefilte fish, matzoh ball soup, cans
of macaroons, haggadahs, shelf stable meals, ‘Seder-in-a-Box’—Seder plates with all ritual items
except for romaine lettuce and hard boiled egg, and kosher for Passover snacks for institution use
and resale in the canteen/commissary.”
Holiday Programs and Services, ALEPH INST.,
http://www.aleph-institute.org/programs/holiday-programs-a-services.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013)
(emphasis added).
205. Lowenfeld, supra note 202.
206. No. 1:07 CV-00594 SMM, 2009 WL 2230871, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2009) (Plaintiff
was an inmate at Coalinga State Hospital.).
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considered a gross understatement, the court explained: “Kosher[-]forPassover meals have stricter dietary requirements than both non-Kosher and
regular Kosher meals.”207
The court noted, “Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ restriction on his ability to keep Kosher-for-Passover was
absolute, and that this restriction put Plaintiff to a Hobson’s choice in which
he was forced to either violate his sincerely-held religious beliefs or
starve.”208 The prisoner also alleged that, “in addition to not receiving the
Kosher-for-Passover meals he requested, he was subjected to discipline due
to his complaints.”209 Sokolosky requested compensatory damages of $1
million for violating RLUIPA and punitive damages of $4 million “for
massive intentional disrespect for Judaism and unjustifiable and intentional
anti-Semitism.”210
In Greenberg v. Hill, the prisoner received a ceremonial Seder plate as
his meal.211 The prison argued that the failure to receive a real meal was an
“unintentional oversight resulting from inadvertent miscommunication,”
while the prisoner believed that prison officials purposely deprived Jewish
inmates of the Passover meal on the two Seder nights.212 The court, in
finding that the deprivation did not amount to a substantial burden, noted
that the prisoner had received all his kosher-for-Passover meals in previous
years.213 The court did not seem to comprehend that the festive meal—as
opposed to a plate of symbolic and generally inedible food214—was itself
part of the celebration.215 Similarly, it is hard to know whether—in another
case—the service of bagels on Passover represents incompetence,

207. Id. at *1. For instance, Passover requires completely different sets of milk and meat dishes,
pots, and utensils.
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id. at *4.
211. No. 2:07-CV-1076, 2009 WL 890521, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2009).
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id.
214. Id. at *1 (listing the Seder plate ingredients as “1. Matzah 2. Kosher grape juice 3.
Parsley (or celery) 4. One hard boiled or roasted egg 5. Salt water 6. Horseradish 7. Charosat
(mixture of kosher grape juice, scraped apple & nuts) 8. Roasted shank bone (a chicken neck may
be substituted)”).
215. Id. at *7. In the Seder, Shulchan Aruch, literally, “a set table”—the portion of the Seder in
which everyone eats—is a crucial component. See generally Eli Touger, At Our Rebbes’ Seder
Table: Glossary, SICHOS IN ENGLISH, available at http://www.sichosinenglish.org/books/at-ourrebbes-seder-table/28.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
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indifference, unfortunate stereotyping, or actual hostility.216
Passover observance also brings to light prisoner misbehavior. For
instance, in Edwards v. Bruno, a prisoner was denied matzah because he was
found to be hoarding it and selling matzahs in the prison yard.217
Finally, and not insignificantly, questions of equal treatment arise. In
her prison memoir entitled ORANGE IS THE NEW BLACK: MY YEAR IN A
WOMEN’S PRISON, Piper Kerman recounts a conversation she had when a
Jewish prisoner had been given boxes of matzah for Passover:
This excited the interest of the other prisoners. “How come they get
them big crackers?” a neighbor from B Dorm asked me, probing the
mysteries of faith. “Them crackers would be good with jelly.”
Nina, with her bangs in rollers, tilted her head as she reminisced
about Passovers past. “One year I was in Rikers. Matzoh was the
only edible thing they gave us,” she mused, rolling her cigarette
thoughtfully between her fingers. “It’s a delicious with buttah.”218
B. Seders in Prison
The prisoners’ celebration of the Seder is obviously not the same as
what it would be outside of prison. Grape juice substitutes for wine.219
Prayers may be interrupted for a headcount.220 At the end of the evening,
everyone must return to his cell.221 Sometimes the meals sound delicious.222
At other times, the food is inadequate,223 or worse—entirely unavailable.224

216. Green v. Werholtz, Nos. 08-3260–JAR, 08-3261–JAR, 06-3198, 2010 WL 3878772, at *2
(D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2010).
217. No. CV085005022S, 2009 WL 5322227, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2009).
218. PIPER KERMAN, ORANGE IS THE NEW BLACK: MY YEAR IN A WOMAN’S PRISON 106
(2010).
219. Melvin, supra note 32.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. In Los Angeles County Jail on Passover 2011, prisoners received
a meal of roast chicken, potato kugel and carrot tzimmes [carrots cooked in honey].
Included in each prisoner’s box are four boxes of grape juice, an Artscroll paperback
[H]aggadah and a plastic seder plate with all the fixings, all of them freezer-safe. (The
green vegetable on the plate is celery, which freezes better than the alternatives.).
Lowenfeld, supra note 202.
223. See Love v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. 10–1714 (GEB), 2011 WL 345964, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan.
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V. THE SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PASSOVER OBSERVANCE IN PRISON
Beyond formal legal issues of prisoners’ rights and administrative
protocol is the deep personal and symbolic meaning that the Seder and
Passover holiday have for those who are incarcerated.
Passover can be a difficult time of year for Jewish inmates. First of all,
the prisoners may particularly miss their families during the time of this
family holiday celebration.225 Furthermore, the irony of the prisoners’
situation—celebrating a ritual of liberation inside prison—is not lost on
them.226 Sid Kleiner, longtime director of Beth Tikvah Jewish Prisoner
Outreach,227 explains:
Along with separation from family, there is a painful theme to the
holiday—redemption, freedom from bondage and captivity. Jewish
inmates gather around the Seder table and declare that, “this year
we are free.” It isn’t easy to make this declaration with barbed wire,
high walls, and correctional officers in view.228
In some ways, Jews in prison might be associated with the wicked
son,229 who in various editions of the Haggadah is presented as a soldier, a

31, 2011) (arguing that plaintiff failed to state a claim that his civil rights were violated when he
received for his Seder meal “‘a regular kosher for Passover vegetarian 12 oz prepackaged tray’” that
“failed to meet plaintiff’s definition of ‘festiveness’”).
224. Jonathan Pollard, who was convicted in the United States of spying for Israel, wrote of his
incarceration: “Every Passover there is not enough food and hunger is my constant companion. This
year will be worse: the Kosher-for-Passover foods for sale in the prison commissary were stolen by
other inmates. What will be now, I have no idea.” Jonathan Pollard, My 21st Passover in Prison,
JUSTICE FOR JONATHAN POLLARD (Apr. 13, 2006), available at http://www.jonathanpollard.org/
2006/041306a.htm.
225. Rhodes, supra note 204.
226. Rabbi Binyomin Schneiman, who serves the Cook County Jail, observed: “Each one of
them is fighting for freedom[.] They’re actually in an Egypt, in a sense. They are incarcerated.
They are in bondage.” Id.
227. “Beth Tikvah literally means ‘house of hope.’” Trudy Kleiner & Sid Kleiner, Jewish
Prisoner Outreach, BETH TIKVAH JEWISH PRISONER OUTREACH, http://bt.isrv.org/?page_id=2 (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013).
228. Mark Mietkiewicz, Pesach & Prison, DOING JEWISH IN TORONTO (March 8, 2007),
http://www.jewishtorontoonline.net/home.do?ch=highway_articles&jt_style=detail&cid=4743.
229. The wicked son is one of the archetypal four sons who play a prominent role in the Seder.
Each son appears in the Haggadah, asks a different question, and gets a personal answer regarding
the significance of the Passover holiday. The simple son asks a simple question: “What is this?”
See Zeitlin, supra note 4.
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boxer, a robber baron, a scowling child, or a punk rocker.230 The wicked son
asks: “What is this service to you?”231 The Haggadah explains that the
wicked son’s sin is to refer “to you” and to exclude himself.232 It teaches
that because the wicked son “separated himself from the community, he
rejects that which is essential.”233 The Haggadah further instructs:
And you will blunt his teeth and say to him “Because of this [i.e., in
return for my offering the Pesach sacrifice] G-d acted for me . . . in
my leaving Egypt.” For you and not for him [the wicked son]; had
he been there, he would not have been redeemed.234
Prisoners have been convicted of doing something wicked and they are
indeed separated from the community, but they have not committed the sin
of the wicked son. By requesting a Seder and matzah, the inmates
affirmatively express their affiliation with the Jewish people and their
identity as Jews. Although they are not redeemed and still in bondage,
modern Jewish prisoners seek connection with the rest of world Jewry by
celebrating the festival of freedom. Therefore, according to the reasoning of
the Haggadah, unlike the wicked son, those celebrating Passover in prison
would have been redeemed in the Exodus. They are, however, like the
wicked son in one interesting respect. The prisoners’ questions about the

230. Eliyahu Fink, Who Is the Wicked Son?, FINKORSWIM (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://finkorswim.com/2011/04/27/who-is-the-wicked-son (discussing and demonstrating various
illustrations of the wicked son).
231. Ari Kahn, The Wicked Son in the Passover Haggadah, EXPLORATIONS: TORAH
COMMENTARY BY RABBI ARI KAHN (Apr. 3, 2009), http://arikahn.blogspot.com/2009/04/wickedson-in-passover-haggadah.html (citations omitted). The original Hebrew “lachem” is in the plural.
A better translation might be: “What’s this service to you people?” Cf. Shaul Robinson, The Wicked
Child and Boycotts, THE VOICES OF LINCOLN SQUARE SYNAGOGUE (April 10, 2012),
http://voicesoflss.wordpress.com/2012/04/10/the-wicked-child-and-boycotts/.
232. Kahn, supra note 231
233. Id. (He denied Judaism.).
234. Id. One can question the parenting style involved in answering the wicked son’s question
and the very different treatment of the sons. Readers of the Haggadah have to do interpretive
somersaults to distinguish the wicked son’s question from the wise son’s. See id. (noting the similar
language used by both sons). The wise son asks, “What are the testimonies, statutes and laws that
the Lord our God commanded you?” Rav Amnon Bazak, The Four Sons, ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY
VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (David Silverberg trans.), available at http://www.vbmtorah.org/pesach/pes68-ab.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). The wise son also seems to ask about
“you.” Id. His wisdom allegedly comes from the legalistic inquiry and the mention of God. Id.
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Seder are not lawyer-like as the wise son’s are,235 but instead relate to
feelings and emotion. The wicked son’s question is thus arguably more
emotional and psychologically astute. “What is this business to you?” leads
inevitably to the more introspective questions concerning the personal
significance of the holiday to the questioner.
Passover provides the inmates with a chance to consider the true nature
of freedom. Even though they remain captives, they can be spiritually free.
Their spiritual freedom signifies their humanity and resistance to those who
might quash their spirit. Kleiner tells the inmates: “‘We seize this
opportunity to remind our blue-garbed brethren that, in soul and spirit, the
essence of freedom remains intact. One need not surrender one’s soul and
spirit to institutionalization.’”236
The power of the Seder arises in part from the tension between the
celebration of freedom and the prisoners’ current condition. Charles
Johnson, who is currently serving a life sentence with no parole in a
maximum-security prison, explores this dichotomy between physical and
spiritual freedom.237 Johnson appears in documentary footage, previously
entitled American Prison: The Forgotten Jews,238 and poignantly and
insightfully examines the significance of the Passover Seder. In an
evocative reframing of the language of the Haggadah he says, “Now we are
here in Tomoka;239 next year may we be in the land of Israel. Now we are
slaves; next year may we be free.”240 Johnson explains: “I’m in bondage, but
I don’t let them buy their way inside and keep me down inside. They can
have the body. They can’t have the mind.”241 Johnson considers the
spiritual significance of his incarceration:

235. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
236. See Mietkiewicz, supra note 228.
237. AMERICAN PRISON: THE FORGOTTEN JEWS (Shining Light Productions 2009), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lP0IAGmD8o&feature=related (transcript available from the
director Rhonda Moskowitz via http://teshuvafilm.wordpress.com/). Rabbi Charles Rudansky also
raised the issue of “Passover under chains.” Rhonda Moskowitz, Passover Behind Bars,
TESHUVAFILM’S BLOG (Apr. 18, 2011), http://teshuvafilm.wordpress.com/. He asked the Sing Sing
inmates about a sense of freedom and liberation when one is incarcerated and does not have one’s
physical freedom. Id.
238. AMERICAN PRISON: THE FORGOTTEN JEWS, supra note 237.
239. Id. (referring to Tomoka Correctional Institution in Daytona Beach, Florida).
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Maybe coming here was the way that Hashem [literally, “the
name,” a respectful name for God] slowed us down to get our
attention. By no means, this is not a wonderful place and we all
want to be home with our families. I know I want to be home. Just
try to remember that. And no one can enslave you within. They
might be able to take this [points to himself], keep this locked away
but they can’t enslave who you are inside.242
In a similar fashion, Rabbi Levi Klein, who serves incarcerated Jews in
Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi, ponders how to celebrate freedom
with people who are in jail.243 He concludes, “They’re really celebrating the
freedom of the soul.”244
Prisoners reflect on the theme that their incarceration has personal
spiritual meaning and probe what or who constitutes the Pharaoh in their
lives.245 They seek the oppressors in their lives—naming bad choices,
addictions, or deep-seated anger. For instance, the women who gathered for
a Seder at the California Institution for Women focused on their personal
liberation.246 Joni Cyran-Kaempfer, who has been in prison since 2002,
announced, tapping her chest above her heart, “I feel completely free . . . .
Truly, truly, it’s right here.”247 Shari Stevens, a thirty-five-year-old who had
two months left on a fraud sentence, kicked her addiction to
methamphetamine, which she called “‘my personal Egypt.’”248 “‘Even
242. Id.; see also Mietkiewicz, supra note 228.
243. Melvin, supra note 32.
244. Melvin, supra note 32.
245. Obviously, not all prisoners are truly devoted or introspective. I have my doubts about
former Liberian President Charles Taylor, who gave permission for his trial to proceed in his
absence while he remained in his cell to celebrate Passover. Alpha Sesay, Charles Taylor Did Not
Send Traditional Herbalists to Prevent RUF Rebels from Bullets, Defense Witness Says, THE TRIAL
OF CHARLES TAYLOR (March 30, 2010), http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2010/03/30/charlestaylor-did-not-send-traditional-herbalists-to-prevent-ruf-rebels-from-bullets-defense-witness-says/.
Taylor “converted to Judaism after his relocation to The Hague to face” the United Nations-backed
Special Court for Sierra Leone for his “role in supporting RUF rebels in Sierra Leone who
committed” genocide. Id.
246. Doug Irving, Passover in Women’s Prison Celebrates Freedom, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER,
(Apr.
10,
2011),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/prison-295781-passoversunday.html.
247. Id.
248. Id. This sentiment was echoed by Lucien Izraylov, who celebrated Passover in the Cook
County Jail because of “his fourth DUI arrest for heroin.” Rhodes, supra note 204. He stated of his
time incarcerated, “I’m trying to free myself from slavery—of addiction.” Id.
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though I’m in here, I feel free, I feel liberated,’ she said. ‘That’s what it is
for me. My liberation.’”249
Rather than posing an existential crisis, Passover in prison prompts
reflection about the true nature of freedom, free choice, and destiny.
Johnson ponders, “Maybe, just maybe, freedom could have been our
Egypt.”250 As Johnson explained to his fellow inmates attending the Seder:
I know we might think of this place as an Egypt. And—and maybe
it is Egypt. Maybe there’s more to it. Maybe there’s more to our
being here than just this being Egypt. Maybe Hashem [God] has a
reason for each of us to be here, just maybe. Maybe he wants us to
shine and be a light in this—as we know—dark place.251
VI. HOW IS THIS PRISONER PROBLEM DIFFERENT FROM ALL OTHER
PRISONER PROBLEMS?252
Prisoner requests for Seders and special diets on Passover are in some
respects unique and in other ways illustrative of many recurrent religious
exercise issues in prison—providing a good example of the difficult and
delicate balance between religious rights and the needs of prison
administrators. Passover observance in prison raises important First
249. Irving, supra note 246.
250. AMERICAN PRISON: THE FORGOTTEN JEWS, supra note 237. Johnson expanded on his
comments, explaining the concept of a personal Egypt:
Egypt represents something that oppresses, enslaves or controls. Something that keeps
a person imprisoned! Not always a physical imprisonment.
...
Once I came to this! wonderful place . . . . I realized that all that stuff, the money, nice
things, etc. was not what was important, and I saw how those things had trapped my
mind, enslaved my thinking process, and I came to call that freedom my Egypt, that I had
to come out of “it,” for my eyes to open. To see the way I allowed it to enslave me.
What is freedom? Is it being able to walk down a street to places you wish to go?!
Yes!
But also freedom has another avenue. Freedom within. Which to me is more important
than any amount of money!
So, the physical freedom that I was enslaved by, was my Egypt! [A]nd coming here,
(even though I wish to be free,) was a type of exodus for me, an exodus from the
distractions, that I was constantly bombarded by.
Letter from Charles Johnson to Aviva Orenstein (July 25, 2011) (on file with the author).
251. AMERICAN PRISON: THE FORGOTTEN JEWS, supra note 238.
252. This is a riff on a famous question (usually asked by the youngest person at the Seder),
“[W]hat makes this night different from all other nights?” See SCHNEERSON, supra note 11, at 7.
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Amendment issues of assessing prisoners’ sincerity, determining the extent
of accommodation required, avoiding the establishment of religion, and
addressing legitimate concerns about unequal treatment of prisoners. To
echo the Passover liturgy, “[e]ven if all of us were wise, all of us
understanding [of the plight of prisoners], all of us knowing the . . .
[Constitution], we would still be obligated to” puzzle out a fair balance
between all the competing interests and to wonder whether prison
administrators should be saddled (or trusted?) with such important
determinations.253 Everyone, who discusses these questions (or at least is
engaged by them), is praiseworthy.254
In the context of Passover, we can elide at least some tough
constitutional and policy questions that arise with other types of religious
observance covered by RLUIPA. Certainly, there are cases where the
existence of a substantial burden is debatable,255 but Passover is not one of
them. Because Passover is such an established and important holiday, and
the traditional rules are exacting and non-negotiable, few questions arise
about the substantial burden on a sincere prisoner’s religious practice.
Failure to provide kosher-for-Passover food or a Seder is per se a substantial
burden.256 In contrast with Muslim prisoners’ requests for halal diets,257
253. See SCHNEERSON, supra note 11, at 8.
254. Id. The Haggadah provides: “Even if all of us were wise, all of us understanding, all of us
knowing the Torah, we would still be obligated to discuss the exodus from Egypt; and everyone who
discusses the exodus from Egypt at length is praiseworthy.” Id.
255. Accord Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2007).
256. Obviously, complaints regarding the quality, taste, or amount of kosher food may not rise
to the level of a substantial burden. See, e.g., Kretchmar v. Beard, 241 F. App’x 863, 865 (3d Cir.
2007) (holding that inmate’s religious exercise was not substantially burdened by his regularly
receiving cold, not hot, kosher meals that were nutritionally adequate); Strope v. Cummings, No.
05–3385–SAC, 2009 WL 3045463, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 22, 2009) (holding that prisoner who
received a kosher diet from a special supervised kosher kitchen had no RLUIPA claims based on the
facts that “(1) he was served ‘warm/wilted salads’; (2) he was ‘rarely served seasonal fruits’; (3) he
was never served food items such as macaroni salad, potato salad, watermelon, or baked potatoes;
[and] (4) the Kosher menu was not rotated”), aff’d, 381 F. App’x 878 (10th Cir. 2010).
257. Courts are split on whether providing a halal diet is a requirement of RLUIPA. Some hold
that denial of a halal diet is not a substantial burden. See Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d
807, 811 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that failure to provide a halal dining option did not substantially
burden inmate’s religious exercise, because prison did provide vegetarian kosher options and inmate
could purchase halal meals at commissary); Watkins v. Shabazz, 180 F. App’x 773, 775 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that failure to provide inmate with halal meals did not substantially burden religious
exercise, because the prison provided him with vegetarian options and the ability to contract with
outside sources to provide his halal meals). But see Gonzalez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 334 F. App’x.
984 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that denial of meals that comport with halal stated a claim under
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which courts often find are satisfied by providing vegetarian options or
common fare,258 requests for kosher food—especially on Passover—require
much more accommodation, which courts tend to acknowledge as a
substantial burden on prisoners’ religious practice when they are denied.259
Passover observance and access to kosher food in general, however, do
highlight three other significant problems with RLUIPA’s application. First,
even if the prison’s actions substantially burden a sincere religious practice,
there remains the question of what qualifies as a compelling governmental
interest that justifies refusal to accommodate the prisoner. On a very
practical level, Passover’s exacting food regulations and the complicated
logistics of the Seder meal demand the prison’s administrative attention,
money, and guard time.260 These are consequential issues, especially when
resources are scarce.261 In extreme cases where safety is a concern and cost
is exorbitant, courts have found a compelling governmental interest that
outweighs a substantial burden on prisoners’ religious practice.262 Given the
RLUIPA); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 888–90 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the denial of halal
or kosher meats to a Muslim prisoner could constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA). Other
courts reject requests for halal because of the cost, which they find a compelling governmental
interest. See Via v. Wilhelm, No. 7:11cv00050, 2011 WL 5419709, at *6, n.6 (W.D. Va. Nov. 9,
2011) (rejecting RLUIPA claim by Muslim inmate, who wanted halal meat (at a cost of $6.00 per
day) rather than soy protein substitute (at a cost of $2.85 per day) and finding management of costs a
compelling interest supporting decision to offer a substitute protein that is inoffensive to a broad
range of religions); Muhammad v. Crosby, No. 4:05cv193–WS, 2009 WL 2913412, at *10 (N.D.
Fla. Sept. 3, 2009) (finding lack of halal food options did not violate RLUIPA because of compelling
state interests of minimizing costs and security), aff’d sub nom., Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App’x
892 (11th Cir. 2010).
258. See Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing common fare diet
as one designed to meet the needs of a wide variety of religious groups); Jerry C. Chow, Resnick v.
Adams: The Lawful Denial of a Jewish Prisoner’s Right to Keep Kosher?, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 45,
46–47 (2003) (describing common fare diet). But see Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301,
1319–20 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
failure to provide a halal diet substantially burdened a Muslim inmate’s religious exercise where he
sincerely believed that the Qur’an required him to eat halal meat and not just a vegetarian diet).
259. See, e.g., Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).
260. See Andreola v. Wisconsin, 211 F. App’x 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that kosher
meals cost “nearly four times the cost of non-kosher meals”); Isbell v. Ryan, No. CV 11–0391–
PHX–JAT (JFM), 2011 WL 6050337, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2011) (arguing that special meals
increase necessary planning and staff accommodations).
261. See Michael Jacobson, The High Cost of Prisons: Using Scarce Resources Wisely, CRIME
REPORT (Feb. 12, 2012, 8:20 PM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-criminal-justice/
2012-02-the-high-cost-of-prisons-using-scarce-resources-wise (highlighting substantial “prison costs
that fall outside the state corrections budgets”).
262. See, e.g., Curry v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. C–09–3408 EMC (pr), 2013 WL 75769, at *10
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clear mandate of RLUIPA and the deep significance of Passover observance,
cost alone should rarely—if ever—constitute a compelling governmental
interest. Teasing out the problem of cost is complicated; it requires
addressing the more difficult question of who qualifies for a special religious
diet. Currently, given the number of prisoners who demand kosher food, the
cost is minimal in light of the entire prison budget.263 If, however, more and
more prisoners request kosher food, the persuasiveness of cost as creating a
compelling governmental interest will become more plausible.
Second, prison officials necessarily become entangled in religion when
they must decide who is sincere—and hence who deserves the special (and
often more expensive) religious dietary accommodations. This leads to two
related problems: intrusiveness regarding prisoners’ spiritual beliefs and the
general imposition of various religious orthodoxies. Prison officials are
rightfully skeptical of the “Church of Red Wine and Steak” and any other
less blatant conversion of a food preference into a religious requirement.264
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2013) (discussing cases where cost of non-GMO, totally organic diet overrode a
prisoner’s sincere religious dietary request); see also, Taylor G. Stout, The Costs of Religious
Accommodation in Prisons, 96 VA. L. REV. 1201 (2010) (arguing that RLUIPA imposed more
onerous financial burdens on prisons than Congress intended and that several circuits have
determined that the cost of RLUIPA accommodations outweigh the religious interests of prisoners).
263. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 795 (5th Cir. 2012)
(“Although cost reduction, as a general matter, is unquestionably a compelling interest of TDCJ, we
are skeptical that saving less than .05% of the food budget constitutes a compelling interest.”).
Chaplain Gary Friedman, who works in the Washington State Department of Corrections and serves
as executive director of Jewish Prisoner Services International, estimates that the additional cost for
kosher food in prison to be forty million dollars. See T. Cohn, Nation’s Prisons Face Soaring
Demand
for
Kosher
Food;
Estimate
at
$40
Million,
KOSHER
TODAY,
http://www.koshertoday.com/Nations-Prisons-Face-Soaring-Demand-for-Kosher-Food.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 8, 2013). Obviously, costs rise considerably if the prison provides a special kosher
kitchen. New York has a long running hot kosher kitchen at the Green Haven Correctional Facility,
where kosher food is prepared on site and provided for approximately 3,000 prisoners throughout the
New York penal system. See Gil Shefler, Even Behind Bars, Jewish Life Flourishes, JTA, (Sept. 14,
2009, 11:05 PM), http://www.jta.org/news/article/2009/09/14/1007849/even-behind-bars-jewishlife-flourishes. Texas opened a kosher kitchen in Stringfellow Prison near Houston in 2007. See
Brandon Sample, Maryland Prisoners Receive Kosher Food, PRISON LEGAL NEWS,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/displayArticle.aspx?articleid=21655&AspxAutoDetectCookieSup
port=1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
264. Apparently, in the late 1970s, some federal prisoners came up with the “Church of the New
Song,” which—among other attempts to “cause or encourage disruption of established prison
discipline for the sake of disruption”—requested “a paschal type feast . . . “of steak and wine.”
Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 260 (W.D. Tex. 1978); see also Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90,
99 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding no constitutional violation when inmate was prohibited from forming
groups within prison chapels to promote humanism, because humanist beliefs were found to be
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Yet, overly close scrutiny of practices can lead to the tacit establishment of
an official version of accepted religious practice, which may injure sincere
personal religious beliefs that vary from religious tradition. One good
example of this is the tendency of prison officials to administer religious
tests to the prisoners to examine their sincerity—what I have dubbed in the
context of kosher food as the “cheeseburger test.”265
Quizzing prisoners about their current level of knowledge of ritual
observance fails to account for inmates who wish to develop more
connection to their religion—something that the hardship and emptiness of
prison life might inspire.266 Furthermore, just because a religious person
slips and violates the tenets of his faith does not mean he should be cut off
from his religious practice entirely. As one court aptly observed, “A sincere
religious believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because he is not
scrupulous in his observance; for where would religion be without its
backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?”267 A Muslim who breaks the
Ramadan fast to eat during the day or a Jew who buys a cheeseburger at the
commissary should not automatically be presumed to be insincere in his
religious beliefs, just weak in his ability to execute its demands.
Additionally, given the diversity of Jewish practice,268 a prisoner may
sincerely wish to avoid bread on Passover but nevertheless eat cheeseburgers
throughout the year.
rooted in philosophy, not religion); United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the Church of Marijuana is a philosophy, not a religion).
265. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
266. See Shefler, supra note 263 (observing that some Jewish inmates “embrace a religion they
long had neglected”).
267. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791–92 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Reed v. Faulkner, 842
F.2d 960, 962–63 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that Rastafarianism is a religious belief, and that some
backsliding or failure to adhere to every religious tenet does not mean that an inmate is not a sincere
believer in the faith). But see Lute v. Jonson, No. 1:08–cv–00234–EJL, 2012 WL 913749, at *7 (D.
Idaho Mar. 16, 2012) (“Although ‘backsliding’ or nonobservance of a religious practice is not
dispositive, it is evidence of a prisoner’s religious insincerity . . . . Purchasing nonkosher foods—
both before and after his kosher diet request—is completely inconsistent with Plaintiff’s professed
religious belief.”). See generally, Kevin L. Brady, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can
Lapsing Prisoners Recover Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431 (2011) (discussing
prisoner backsliding and RLUIPA); Shannon A. Burns, Perfect Piety?: Transgression and
Redemption Within the Legal Structures Affording Prisoners the Right to a Religious Diet, 50 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 153 (2011) (examining the denial of prisoners’ access to religious dietary
programs after violating the program rules).
268. See WASKOW & BERMAN, supra note 8.

108

[Vol. 41: 61, 2013]

Once We Were Slaves, Now We Are Free
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Prison officials’ arbitration of religious authenticity reinforces certain
religious orthodoxies and thereby entangles these government officials in
religious issues. For instance, Judaism encompasses many different
traditions, and what qualifies as kosher is a matter of some debate among
Jewish denominations.269 Yet, the dominant (and often very compassionate)
voice for Jewish religious practice in prison comes mainly from Orthodox
institutions whose practitioners may hold more rigid beliefs than some
Jewish prisoners who do not accept all such beliefs or practices but are
nevertheless sincere.270
A more serious problem with entanglement arises when prison officials
decide who “counts” as Jewish. Problems arise not merely with religious
fakers, who wish to con prison administrators,271 but also with those who
sincerely consider themselves Jewish, though others do not accept them as
such.272 Those advocating for Jews in prison often reflect an Orthodox
worldview and have no patience for Messianic Jews or others they do not
believe are Jewish or entitled to kosher-for-Passover food and a Seder.273
Representatives of such organizations welcome all Jews who choose to be
more traditional but affirmatively attempt to exclude those whom they
269. The Orthodox Union (“OU”) has its own certification process, and the Conservative
Movement in Judaism recognizes as kosher some items, such as gelatin, that the OU does not. Cf.
EDWARD K. KAPLAN, SPIRITUAL RADICAL: ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL IN AMERICA, 1940–1972
132 (2007) (recounting the story that as his rabbinical students at the Jewish Theological Seminary
of America—the rabbinical school for the Conservative movement—debated whether gelatin was
kosher, Rabbi Heschel, who marched in Selma with Martin Luther King, interrupted to ask,
“Gentleman, can you tell me if the atomic bomb is kosher?”). In Wright v. Bennett, No. 5:08–CT–
3129–BO, 2010 WL 3075519, at *1–2 (E.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d, 415 Fed. App’x 476 (4th Cir. 2011),
the prisoner insisted upon and received pre-packaged kosher meals certificated by the OU and
prepared them in a prison microwave dedicated for that purpose. Not all Jews who keep kosher
would insist on such stringencies. Even within the orthodox community there is debate about certain
foods. Some ultra-Orthodox Jews require “Chalav Yisrael,” dairy products that derive from cows
milked under rabbinic supervision, reflecting the medieval concern that milk from non-kosher
animals would be combined with cow’s milk. See Howard Jachter, Chalav Yisrael—Part I: Rav
Soloveitchik’s View, RABBI JACHTER’S HALACHA FILES (Oct. 25, 2003), available at
http://koltorah.org/ravj/13-7%20Chalav%20Yisrael%20-%20Part%201.htm (“[A] question that is
often debated in the Orthodox community is whether or not one may drink packaged milk that is not
under Rabbinic supervision.”).
270. See generally, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 3 (arguing that the evidentiary burden is
high under RLUIPA for prisoners espousing unique religious beliefs).
271. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 709 (2005) (“[A]ffording religious prisoners
superior rights might encourage prisoners to become religious.”).
272. See supra notes 185–91 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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consider non-Jews.274
Menachem Katz, director of prison and military outreach of the Aleph
Institute (the major charitable organization that advocates for and provides
benefits to Jewish prisoners),275 explained that he wanted prison officials to
“be very careful about who they give kosher food to.”276 He said: “We don’t
want them to give kosher food to every Tom, Dick and Harry if they say
they are Jewish.”277 Similarly, a chaplain in Washington State lamented: “If
only those prisoners who were actually Jewish claimed Judaism as their
religion and requested kosher food, there would be no problem with any
particular prisoner receiving kosher meals.”278
Although modern Judaism is fractured over whether someone may be
considered Jewish if he has a Jewish father but not a Jewish mother,279 the
Orthodox definition requiring matrilineal descent is sometimes tacitly
enforced by prisons.280 For instance, in one case, prison officials inquired as
to why the Aleph Institute (an Orthodox organization) was assisting a
prisoner who was not born of a Jewish mother.281 This inquiry caused the
Institute to stop sending the prisoner religious materials because it did not
deem him Jewish.282 A Rabbi, who was a Jewish prison chaplain in New
York, repeatedly asked inmates their names and posed questions about their
parents to, in the words of a prisoner, “confirm whether or not I’m really
274. See Zeveloff, supra note 163.
275. The Aleph Institute is an Orthodox non-profit organization that serves, among other
constituencies, Jewish inmates and their families. The Aleph Institute: An Overview of Unique
Services to the Community, ALEPH INST., http://aleph-institute.org/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2013).
276. Zeveloff, supra note 163 (internal quotation marks omitted).
277. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. Cohn, supra note 263 (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. Reform Judaism accepts patrilineal descent; Orthodox and Conservative Judaism do not.
See, e.g., Jason Miller, Patrilineal ‘Dissent’: Solving the Jewish Status Problem, HUFFINGTON POST
(JULY 19, 2012, 7:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-jason-miller/patrilineal-dissentsolving-the-jewish-status-problem_b_1659620.html.
280. See, e.g., Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 646 (8th Cir. 2009).
281. Id.
282. Id. There is no consensus on how Jewish identity is established. The Central Conference
of American Rabbis, an organization of Reform Judaism, specifically declared in 1983 that “the
child of one Jewish parent is under the presumption of Jewish descent. This presumption of the
Jewish status of the offspring of any mixed marriage is to be established through appropriate and
timely public and formal acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people.” Reform
Movement’s Resolution on Patrilineal Descent, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtual
library.org/jsource/Judaism/patrilineal1.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
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Jewish, or I’m just there saying that I am to get all the perks.”283 By
contrast, in Virginia, prison regulations specifically mention Messianic Jews,
and Yahwists, as deserving matzah, a Seder plate, and kosher-for-Passover
food, though the regulations specify that each group has its own separate
Seder.284
RLUIPA is clear that it is sincerity of belief, and not ancestry,
membership in a recognized religion, or adherence to traditional tenets, that
establishes a right to religious exercise in prison.285 But it is understandable
(particularly because of the problem of pretenders, some of whom present
security risks) that prison officials rely on outsiders and defer to traditional
definitions of who is a Jew. This entangles prison officials in religion in
ways that raise serious Establishment Clause and equal treatment concerns.
Even if some testing for sincerity is necessary, the imposition of
“cheeseburger tests” and other orthodoxies crosses the line into unnecessary
entanglement.286
Third, a real problem with equal treatment exists in supplying kosher
food and holiday accommodation to Jewish prisoners, but denying the same
or equivalent benefits to other prisoners. Issues of fairness and safety arise
when one group seems to receive a special benefit.287 Although no question
283. N.J. Burkett, EXCLUSIVE: Rabbi Answers Accusations, WABC (June 17, 2009), available
at http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=6870439 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
284. VA. DEP’T OF CORR., MASTER RELIGIOUS CALENDAR, OPERATING PROCEDURE 841.3, at 1
(effective Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/about/procedures/documents/800/
841-3_A2.pdf (“Matzo provided in place of bread to all Jews, Messianic Jews, and Yahwists during
the entire Passover season. Ceremonial Passover Seder plate provided to Jews, Messianic Jews, and
Yahwists (separately)—one plate for each group (after sundown) . . . . Jews, Messianic Jews, and
Yahwists must have their Passover Seder meal and service separately.”).
285. See Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875, 876 n4 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding where prisoner
adhered to the Rule of St. Benedict, which he believed forbade him from “eating the flesh of fourlegged animals,” the prison’s response that the requested diet “is not required by the Roman Catholic
faith” violated RLUIPA, because prison officials may not require textual or tenet justification of the
diet; the prisoner’s sincere belief should be enough).
286. Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (stating
“religious beliefs need not be . . . logical [or] consistent” to receive First Amendment protection but
must be honest); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–86 (1944) (holding that the government
could dispute “the truth of the representations concerning” a religious belief and could evaluate the
sincerity of the person asserting his religious exercise rights). See generally, CONKLE, supra note
44, at 69–72 (discussing the sincerity of religious beliefs).
287. See, e.g., Reuven Blau, Perv Rabbi Gets Special Jail Meals, NEW YORK POST, Aug. 15,
2010, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/brooklyn/kosher_jail_perks_for_pervert_
hRE6OJU8IIGdEv4gIvq6VK (decrying the fact that “a Rikers jail captain was ordered to pick up
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arises concerning a constitutional equal protection violation, which requires
intentional discrimination,288 perceptions of unequal treatment can stir
resentment and unrest within the prison. This is bad both for the group that
feels deprived and for the group that may be singled out by fellow prisoners
as privileged.
The stark difference between the way halal and kosher requirements are
treated provides an example of understandable perceptions of unequal
treatment. Many jurisdictions do not provide halal meat to Muslim
prisoners, and instead provide only a meat-free diet on the grounds that
vegetarianism comports with Islam’s dietary demands.289 Because the
kosher rules prohibit any contact with many different species (for example,
rabbit, shellfish, venison) in addition to pork, and because the diet must
account for various food combinations and the way the food is prepared and
served, a mere vegetarian diet will not satisfy the most strictly observant
Jews.290 This principled distinction, however, may not address prison
management issues where there is a perception of unequal treatment.
Indeed, certain anti-Jewish animus291 and anti-Semitic stereotypes292 may be
$60 worth of glatt kosher canned meals for the sicko, including Salisbury steak, stuffed shells,
cheese ravioli and barbecued chicken wings”); Burkett, supra note 283 (noting that an Orthodox
Rabbi and prison chaplain, Leib Glanz, was criticized for “creat[ing] an enclave of privilege
exclusively for Jewish inmates”); William K. Rashbaum & Paul Von Zielbauer, Rabbi for Jails Said
to Ease Stays of Jewish Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/13/nyregion/13jail.html?_r=0.
288. Courts routinely reject equal protection claims by prisoners. See Hearn v, Kennell, 433
Fed. App’x 483, 484 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting Muslim prisoner’s equal protection claim—finding
no intent to discriminate because Jews received kosher meat while he only received vegetarian fare
instead of halal); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that an inmate “cannot
obtain relief if the difference between the defendants’ treatment of him and their treatment of
[inmates of another religion] is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”); Holmes v.
Conway, No. 1:12–CV–4105–TWT–RGV, 2012 WL 6923588, *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 2012)
(holding that a Muslim prisoner failed to state equal protection claim where Muslims did not receive
halal meat but Jews received kosher food, because he failed to allege facts to show that Jewish
inmates were not similarly situated regarding their ability to meet religious dietary requirements).
But cf. Turkman v. Ashcroft, 915 F. Supp. 2d. 314, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that Muslim
inmates, who alleged verbal abuse, prohibition on having Korans in their cells, and frequent
interruptions of their prayers, raised plausible equal protections concerns).
289. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Eliezer Posner, Are vegan restaurants automatically kosher?, CHABAD,
http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/547235/jewish/Are-vegan-restaurants-kosher.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013) (discussing kosher restaurant certification requirements).
291. See, e.g., Robinson v. U.S. Gov’t, No. 08-CV-0902 (NGG), 2008 WL 4283649, *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008) (Jewish prisoner reported anti-Semitic verbal abuse during an assault by a
prison guard breaking up Jewish services early.); Bass v. Grottoli, No. 94 Civ. 3220 (MGC), 1998
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triggered by perceived special treatment for Jewish prisoners. One notorious
New York case, where a Rabbi managed to organize a lavish six-hour bar
mitzvah for a prisoner’s son in a New York City jail gymnasium, created an
uproar and raised questions about special privileges for Jews in prison.293
But even less extreme examples of special treatment—the receipt of fresh
chicken and grape juice for Friday night dinner—can be perceived as unfair
and foster resentment.294
In light of the potential intrusion and entanglement as well as the
concern regarding equal protection, we might question why prisons do not
choose just to offer kosher food to anyone who requests it. Issues of cost
and safety make this solution impossible. Offering kosher food to whoever
asked for it would generate many requests from people who perceive it as
more pure and of better quality but who possess no sincere religious

WL 677580, *2–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1998) (New York prison inmates alleged numerous antiSemitic acts by guards.); Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, The Post-Sheinbein Israeli
Extradition Law: Has It Solved the Extradition Problems Between Israel and the United States or
Has It Merely Shifted the Battleground?, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 36 (2002) (“Jews form a
very small minority in most Western prison populations and are often at risk from anti-Semitic
inmate gangs.”); Douglas Belkin, Advocates: Jewish Community Shuns Its Inmates, PALM BEACH
POST, Aug. 2, 1998, at 1B (“‘Jail isn’t a good place for a Jew.’ . . . ‘On one side, you have 500 neoNazis; on the other side, you’ve got 500 Black Muslims; and in the middle, you’ve got three Jews
scared to death.’”) (quoting the executive director of the Aleph Institute); Rodger Kamenetz, Jews in
Jail, BELIEFNET, http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/Judaism/2000/08/Jews-In-Jail.aspx?p=1 (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013) (quoting Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, director of legal affairs for the Aleph Institute,
testifying at a “Congressional committee in 1998, ‘Many Jews in state prisons are afraid to even
announce their religion, for fear of the anti-Semitic attitude of wardens, guards, and other inmates.
Jewish inmates in Arizona have been knifed and beaten, then placed in isolated segregation “for their
own benefit” while the perpetrators roam free.’”); Mason Lerner, Jews in Jail: The Story of Zev
Isgur and One of the Strangest Jewish Communities You’ll Ever Read About, JEWISH STUDENT
PRESS SERV., http://www.shmoozenet.com/jsps/stories/0998Mason.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2013)
(describing how Jews stuck together in prison and watched out for each other: “‘Ain’t much love for
Jew boys in jail, I can promise you that.’”); Phillip Martin, Jewish Inmate Seeks Segregation from
Anti-Semitic Gangs, NPR (Nov. 6, 2005, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=4991738 (discussing white supremacy in prison). But see Shefler, supra
note 263 (“None of the Jewish inmates interviewed at Green Haven say they have encountered antiSemitism, and state prison authorities say hate groups are not tolerated.”).
292. Foster Kamer, Pervy Rabbi Tricks Traif with Kosher Prison Meals, VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS
(Aug. 16, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2010/08/pervy_rabbi_tri.php
(“[A] Rabbi housed on Rikers Island stopped eating not because he wasn’t being served Kosher
meals, but because the meals weren’t certified by a Rabbi of his choice . . . thus reinforcing the
stereotype of kvetching New York Jews.”).
293. See Rashbaum & Zielbauer, supra note 287.
294. See, e.g., supra note 287.
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requirement.295 Additionally, some prison administrators have experienced
serious safety concerns with providing kosher diets.296 In Florida, certain
gang members learned to request kosher food to assure being sent to the
same facility.297 In Washington, a group of neo-Nazis declared themselves
Jews to assure that they would be housed in the same place.298
Another potential solution—to provide kosher-for-Passover food and a
Seder to anyone who could demonstrate that he observed the holiday before
he was incarcerated—would be too limiting. The issue is sincere religious
desire, not past practice. 299 If indeed prison is a penitentiary—a place to be
penitent and learn from regret for past sin and offenses—then prison must be
a place that allows, if not fosters, spiritual growth. A prisoner, who
discovers meaning in his Jewish faith, should not be prohibited from
expressing that faith for the first time in prison. Certainly RLUIPA will not
allow past behavior to be the sole factor determining prisoner sincerity.300
Therefore, prison administrators are left in the uncomfortable and
frankly impossible position of having to distinguish among prisoners, and
risk intrusion into the prisoners’ beliefs as well as imposing religious
orthodoxy. The importance of this endeavor is increased by the intense
meaning that religious observance—particularly observance of Passover, the
holiday of freedom—represents to sincere prisoners.
VII. CONCLUSION & SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY
Passover is a holiday replete with symbols of freedom. It enjoins
celebrants to resist slavery, appreciate liberty, and foster a sense of empathy
for the oppressed. If for no other reason than its message of freedom, the
celebration of Passover is important to inmates and somewhat challenging
for prison officials. In addition to the poignancy of prisoners’ holiday
celebration, many practical and legal questions arise. An examination of
Passover celebration in prison reveals the surprisingly extensive religious
rights of Jewish prisoners as well as the social and spiritual importance of
the religious observance. Passover celebration allows prisoners to affirm
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
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their individual commitment to Judaism and their collective affiliation with
all who are not free. Perhaps most importantly, it raises questions about the
nature of freedom, and who or what constitutes the Pharaoh in the prisoners’
lives. Poignantly and insightfully, the inmates look within their personal
histories to find what has served as their oppressors—including bad choices,
addictions, and deep-seated anger. Celebration of Passover also raises tough
doctrinal issues of equal treatment and government entanglement in religion.
What unites both the legal and the social inquiries is a respect for the
prisoners’ humanity and dignity.
Different religious traditions present their own unique challenges to the
interpretation of RLUIPA, and the balancing of prisoners’ and jailers’ needs.
The role of Halal food, and the observance of fasting on Ramadan and
feasting at its conclusion appear with frequency in the case law applying
RLUIPA. Evidence of anti-Muslim bias, issues of cost, and impositions of
religious orthodoxy permeate these cases. An inquiry into the spiritual
meaning for Muslim prisoners as well as the applicability of RLUIPA would
add to this study. Ultimately both inquiries—the legal and the societal—
must address how much religious freedom is desirable or attainable for those
physically imprisoned.
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